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ABSTRACT
Martin Buber preferred to be known as a philosophical 
anthropologist rather than a philosopher, theologian, or teacher. Any 
of these titles are properly used since the scope of his writings con­
tribute significantly to each of these fields.
It is the purpose of this paper to show that what he had to say 
concerning the Ontology of Evil is significant in the study of educa­
tional theory and that his own educational philosophy was influenced by 
his presuppositions concerning the nature of evil.
Chapter II is devoted to the literature relating to the basic 
elements of this study: the problem of evil, evil and the individual, 
evil and the community, and educational theory. Only that literature 
touching the philosophy of Buber in the specified areas has been 
selected.
The study is developed in Chapter III by setting forth Buber's 
concept of the problem of evil as it relates to the individual and the 
community.
The goal of education for Buber was to bring the individual 
into a state of true humanity. This goal is to be reached by traveling
viii
a path in which the nature of the goal is evident, the path of communion.
True human relationships transform evil because relationship 
takes place in the spirit, in the realm of the "between. " When prop­
erly extended, such relationship leads one to the eternal Thou which is 





Man has always had his experiences as I, his experiences with 
others, and with himself; but it is as We, ever again as We, 
that he has constructed and developed a world out of his 
experiences.*
It is characteristic of man that he has always thought his 
thoughts as I. Unless, however, he goes beyond and transplants his 
ideas into the realm of "the between" where communication lakes 
place, the cosmos never becomes r'eal to him. It is through investing 
oneself in the realm of the spirit that one builds and shapes the world
O
in which he lives.
Statement of the Problem
Man does not always reach out in communion, lie may fail to 
respond to the existential claim on his person; "he flees cither into the 
general collective which takes from him his responsibility or into the
 ̂Martin Buber, "What is Common to A ll, " The Knowledge of 





attitude of a self who has to account to no one but himself. Martin
Buber saw these two movements as detrimental to man in his
existence as man, and as the primary sources of evil in the realm of
existence. The clearest mark of this kind of man is that
he cannot really listen to the voice of another; in all his 
hearing, as in all his seeing, he mixes observation. The 
other is not the man over against him whose claim stands 
over against his own in equal right; the other is only his 
object. But he who existentially knows no Thou will never 
succeed in knowing a We. ^
"The child is a reality; education must become a reality. "J 
What prevents the child from becoming? What aids this self- 
actualization? How can the educator assist an individual in becoming 
truly human?
To become aware is to become aware of the wholeness of man. 
Jn his philosophical anthropology, Buber deals with the problem of 
what is "peculiar to man as man. " He presents a method which "deals 
with the concrete, existential characteristic of man's life in order to
O
arrive at the wholeness and uniqueness of man.
The problem of finding man in the complex world of individuals 
and cultures and avoid the "abyss of abstract unity" and "meaningless
3Ibid., p. 108.
^Ibid. , p. 108.
Martin Buber, "Education, " Between Man and Man, (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1965) p. 84.
6Maurice Friedman, "introductory Essay, " Knowledge of Man,
p. 14.
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relativity" in the process is a very real problem.
Evil is a reality and so is freedom. To understand the nature 
of these two concepts is to aid in the understanding of the nature of 
man. The scientific method is not sufficient for this search. One 
must turn to philosophy for the answer; Buber deals with these 
questions in a straight-forward and concrete manner. In order for the 
philosopher to deal with actuality he must have a lived relation with 
the problems with which he deals.
Martin Buber did not write concerning an abstract idea of evil. 
He suffered from the lack of personal relation when at the age of three 
his parents separated and he was forced to live with his grandparents. 
He relates his sadness as a result and describes in detail his feeling 
when he learned that his mother would not be returning to him.
His concept of man's relation to the animal world is understood 
better after reading the account of his experiences as an eleven year 
old. In stroking the neck of a dapple-gray horse Buber said he felt 
the life beneath his hand and described the encounter "as though the 
element of vitality itself bordered on my skin, something that was not
I. "
We are indebted to Aubrey Hodes for some of these more 
personal insights through his book Martin Buber: An Intimate 
Portrait. He tells us also of Buber's contact with Hasidism where he
was introduced to the idea of Community.
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"When I saw the hasidim dance with the Torah, the Scroll of 
Law I knew what community was, " Buber said.
He learned the evil of failure to communicate when a young man 
came to him for counsel and later took his own life. The evil of 
society out of control was very real for him during the persecution of 
Nazi Germany under Adolph Hitler.
The hope of Community became a concrete hope with the birth 
of Israel. His recognition of the problems of establishment of true 
community also became real when he realized that Israel could not 
establish her existence as a nation in peace.
This is not to suggest that these personal incidents in the life 
of Buber brought about his philosophy. Similiar incidents have been 
evident in multitudes. It is rather to point out that his philosophy 
dealt with in this paper had concrete experience from which to draw.
Hypothesis
Implicit in any philosophy of education are the presuppositions 
which have influenced it. It is proposed that the educational philosophy 
of Martin Buber was influenced by his concept of evil and that a proper- 
understanding of evil, as viewed by Buber, is a precondition for the 
understanding of his educational philosophy.
Need for the Study
A proper understanding of the educational philosophy of Martin
-5-
Buber is dependent upon an understanding of his philosophy of evil. 
There has been no definitive work on this subject to date, in spite of 
the fact there is a growing body of literature concerning his philosophy 
in various other aspects.
Purpose of the Study
An unresolved problem in man's world is the presence of evil. 
Buber addressed himself to this problem and to the manner of dealing 
with it. It is the purpose of this study (1) to identify the problem of 
evil in the thought of Buber as it relates to the individual and the 
community, and (2) to show that Buber's concept of evil influenced his 
philosophy of education.
Delimita tions
The problem of evil may be approached from a philosophical 
or from a theological position of inquiry. This work will exclude, for 
the purpose of principal research, those areas dealt with by Buber in 
a purely theological connotation.
Limitation
A large number of works by Buber have been translated into 
English from the German and Hebrew. Not all his work has been so 
translated. This paper will be based upon research from those works 
which are available in the English language.
-6-
Defiaition of Terms
Actual: The real association of the I and You.
Actualize- The gradual process of evolvement through the 
reciprocity of relationships by which that which is becomes present.
Between: That area where communication takes place. It is 
the realm of the earthly manifestation of the spirit.
Community: A group of people all of whom stand in a living, 
reciprocal relationship to one another and who stand in a living, 
reciprocal relationship to a single living center.
Confrontation: The reciprocal forces of nature which produce 
self-realization.
Decision: That act of man whereby with his total being he acts 
out of the freedom of the will.
Doom: The belief in a fate which is pre-determined and which 
belief is a deterrent to the act of turning. The only thing in itself 
which can doom man is the belief in doom.
Education: The selection by man of his effective world.
Ego: The individual who knows only himself as subject. This 
term is to be distinguished from the "ego" of the psychologist. It is 
the I of the basic word I-It. No man is pure ego but may be so ego- 
oriented that he may be so-called.
Encounter: The living experience of relation whereby that 
which confronts one enters into the world of things.
-7-
Evi'l: Evil in the individual is of two types, (1) evil from 
indecision, and (2) evil from choice. The first stage is a non-choice, 
a pseudo-decision. It includes not only a lack of direction but all that 
is done in this condition: grasping, compelling, seducing, exploiting, 
torturing, devouring and destroying. In the second stage man delib­
erately chooses those things which he once did out of indecision. At 
this point evil becomes radical; it is confirmed because it is willed.
Evil in the community arises from the lack of man's x'eladon 
to his fellow man and his failure to recognize and embrace a living 
center.
Evil as used in this work is to be distinguished from moral 
evil which is generally conceived as the lack of conformity to a pre­
arranged pattern.
Experience: Knowledge gained by going over the surface of 
things as opposed to that knowledge which grows out of a dialogical 
rela tion.
Formhood: A coinage by Buber suggesting the manner in which 
creation is revealed through encounter.
Freedom: That state or condition in which one finds within 
himself the power to turn; he who has the power to decide is free.
Hasidism: A movement founded in the eighteenth century by a 
Jewish sect opposed to excessive legalistic forms of Judaism. Martin 
Buber was influenced by the mysticism of this group in his youth.
-8-
Some of his earlier writings dealt with the philosophy of this 
movement.
Human: A person in whom the central You is received in the 
present.
I-Act: The first form of the basic word I-It.
I-Consciousness: The result of the process in which an 
individual confronts himself and ceases to see himself as only a part 
of his You; he views himself as a person capable of entering into 
relation as an I.
I-It: The basic word of separation used by Buber to indicate 
the sphere of goal directed activity. The world of It may include 
people as well as things. The It is used by the I for some end beyond 
itself, i. e. exploitation.
I-You: The basic word of relation used by Buber to indicate a 
timeless relationship between an individual and the world. In this 
relationship neither parties are objects but confront each other as 
persons, both of whom are subjects.
It: The second portion of the basic word I-It and the part 
capable of being ordered or arranged. The It may be identified by its 
separate qualities and is seen in a space-time-cause context.
Knowledge: Knowledge is of two kinds, (1) scientific or 
technical, and (2) knowledge resulting from relationship and experience. 
The former is conceptual and objective; the form in which all knowledge
-9-
must be stored. The later is revelation; it must become conceptual to 
be stored but is the means by which one participates in actuality.
Person: An individual who is capable of entering into a genuine 
relation with another. In the thought of Buber a person stands at the 
opposite pole from the ego.
Presuppositions: Those beliefs which one accepts as being true 
or valid without necessity for rational proof; the basis upon which one 
builds his arguments or establishes his claims.
Reciprocity: That exchange whereby the I is revealed to its \ ou 
and the You is revealed to the I.
Relation: Buber viewed the longing for relation as a primary 
drive growing out of a craving for the You. In relation one becomes 
aware of the present world and its ability to communicate, and may 
include things as well as people.
Self-Realization: The becoming aware of the I in either the 
I-It experience or the I-Thou relationship. The self which is realized 
in either case is a different self from the other.
Spirit: In its human manifestation spirit is a product of man's 
relation with his Thou. It is through man's power to relate that he is 
able to live in the spirit. "It is man's totality that has become 
consciousness, the totality which comprises and integrates all his 
capacities, powers, qualities, and urges.
Soul: When Buber spoke of the soul, he spoke of the total man.
-10-
He did not regard soul as only the spiritual element within man.
Unification: That process whereby one becomes whole; the 
''palling together" of the total self in such a way that one may choose 
the way with his total being. It is the making one of the two urges.
Urge: The passion in which all human action originates. When 
the urge is unified it is capable of goodness. A divided urge produces 
a two-fold urge, one of which is evil. It is not evil per.se but becomes 
the action out of which evil becomes possible. When the two urges are 
again united they become whole and are only then capable of choosing 
goodness.
You: The second portion of the basic word I-You. The You is 
the timeless, causeless, spaceless being which causes the I to 
actualize through confrontation. The innate You is actualized with 
each relationship. Some translators use Thou rather' than You but the 
connotation is the same.
World- Man's effective environment which exists only as he 
recognizes his independence from it and the independent opposites 
which are over against him in it.
Organization of the Study
The remainder of this study is organized in the following 
manner:
1. Chapter II contains a discussion of literature related to 
the subject of the Ontology of Evil and to the educational philosophy
-11-
of Martin Buber.
2. Chapter III describes (1) the nature of evil as it relates to 
the individual, (2) the nature of evil as it relates to the community, 
and (3) the educational philosophy of Martin Buber, with special 
attention to those areas most obviously influenced by his philosophy of 
evi l.
3. Chapter IV is an analysis of the data in relation to his 
educational philosophy.
4. Chapter V consists of the conclusions resulting from the 




In dealing with the related literature one characteristic 
became evident in the evaluation of Buber and his work- Most writers 
did not distinguish between the philosopher, the theologian, the teacher, 
or the man. Those who knew Buber best would probably have thought 
it inconsistent with his own philosophy to have made such a distinction.
Although it was not a major purpose of this paper to deal with 
the problem of evil as it related to Buber's theological position, it has 
been impossible to properly evaluate some of the related literature 
without touching upon this area. Many writers did not distinguish 
between the problem in such a way as to make the separation practical.
One of the foremost interpreters of Martin Buber was Malcom 
Diamond. In his book Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist, Diamond 
declared that Buber was "neither an academic philosopher nor. . .a 
professional theologian. For Buber, philosophical problems
^Malcom Diamond, Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 3.
-12-
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emerged "only when men reflect upon the real questions, that is, on 
questions which engage the total person rather than the intellect 
alone. "2 *5
Jack Cohen wrote concerning Diamond's book, "For the first 
time we have a statement of Buber's position which eschews the 
obscurity of Buber's style and sets forth simply and with great insight
Q
the main outlines of his philosophy.
Arthur A. Cohen's book^ was described in America as 
"succinct but brilliant" and Cohen is called "the most gifted of our 
younger Jewish thinkers.
The Saturday Review carried a statement concerning the place
of Buber in philosophy and theology.
Besides being one of the two or three most eminent Jewish 
philosophers, Buber can be ranked among the ten leading 
Protestant theologians in view of the influence his person- 
alistic philosophy of dialogue has had. ®
Ronald Gittelsohn points out that it is seldom easy to understand
2Ibid., p. 15.
"jack Cohen, review of Martin Buber: Jewish llxistenlialisl, by 
Malcom Diamond, in Jewish Social Studies, 22 November 19(54, p. 12!'.
^Arthur A. Cohen, Martin Buber (New York: Hillary House,
1957).
5
William F. Lynch, S. J. , review of Martin Buber, by Arthur 
A. Cohen, in America, 22 March 1958, p. 728.
0
William Robert Miller, "A Personalistic Philosophy of Hope, 
Saturday Review 51 (February 10, 1968):33.
1
Buber. He pondered whether his following was a "response to his 
doctrine or a reaction to his personality. " Even Maurice Friedman, 
he says, is constrained to admit that in Daniel there is much which is 
"beclouded with esthetic language. In spite of this, he says of 
Daniel that there are enough enjoyable and profitable experiences 
"even for those who fail fully to understand it, or who, understanding, 
cannot altogether subscribe to its tenets, " to make it worth the 
reading. ^
Gabriel Schonfeld pointed out that Buber has probably been kept 
from the larger audiences because he "is often lacking in lucidity and 
requires interpretation. In this same vein Isaac Singer says 
"Because Buber is so obscure, each new book (or new translation) in­
spires the hope that finally the master will elucidate his position.
Maurice Friedman ranks as a leading interpreter of Buber, 
having translated a number of his works.
In all of Martin Buber's works we find a spiritual tension and
seriousness coupled with a breadth of scope which seeks
constantly to relate this intensity to life itself and does not
^Roland B. Gittelsohn, "A World to Make Real, " Saturday 
R eview 31 (August 1, 1964):26.
8Ibid., p. 27.
9
Gabriel Schonfeld, "Those Who Keep Faith with the Covenant, 
Saturday Review 41 (June 7, 1958): 19. 1
1 ^Isaac B. Shevis Singer, "Rootless Mysticism, " Commentary, 
January 1965, p. 77.
-14-
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tolerate its limitation to any one field of thought or to thought
cut off from life.
Friedman says that one may best understand the evolution of 
Ruber's thought as a gradual development from an early period of 
mysticism, through a middle period of extentialism to a mature 
development of dialogical philosophy. This transition was complete 
by 1922. 1 2 *14
"Buber has demanded" says Friedman, "as no other modern 
thinker, the hallowing of the everyday--the redemption of evil through 
the creation of the human community in relation with God. " He sees 
this as an answer to Sartre's evil which is unredeemable. In contrast 
to Sartre, Buber's philosophy is "essentially concrete, close to 
experience and realistic as only a life open to the reality of evil in the 
profoundest sense could produce. " i '3 His philosophy of dialogue has 
"proved to be one of the most original and significant contributions to 
modern theology and philosophy.
Beek and Weiland point out in their book Martin Buber: 
Personalist & Prophet that:
11
MauriceS. Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue 
(London: Routledge and Kenan Paul, Limited, 1955), p. 5.
12
Ibid. , p. 27.
U Ibid., p. 282.
14 uMaurice S. Friedman, Symbol, Myth, and History in the 
Thought of Martin Buber, " The Journal of Religion 34 (January 1954): 1
-16-
In the history of European philosophy Buber was the first 
person to construct an anthropology consistently based on the 
motifs of dialogue and Mitmenschlichkeit (i. e. humanity-in­
fellowship). ^
Karl Barth wrote "If I were a liberal theologian, I should try 
the theology of Martin Buber. Professor Emil Brunner said This
is the point on which I find myself closest of all to Karl Barth. ‘
1 O
Leslie Zeigler held that what Buber regarded as truth is a 
matter not of appropriation as constitutive of one's own existence, but 
of participation or sharing in being. " Appropriation, when happening 
within man, is a part of the I-It experience. ^
Levin Meyer, in "The Sage Who Inspired Hammarskjold, 
points out that Buber was a Zionist from the beginning of the move­
ment, but was a thorn in the side of the Israeli nationalists. He was 
profoundly religious but did not observe Jewish customs. Although a 
refugee from Nazi Germany he resumed cultural contact by accepting
1 6M. A. Beek and J. Sperna Weiland, Martin Buber:
Persona list & Prophet (Westminister: Newman Press, 1968), p. 64.
1 °Karl Barth, "Liberal Theology: Some A Iternatives, "
Hibbert Journal 59 (April 1961):21 7. *1
^ E m il  Brunner, "Karl Barth's Alternatives for Liberal 
Theology: A Comment, " Hibbert Journal 59 (July 1960:319.
1 O
Instructor in Philosophy and Religion at Oregon State 
University.
^ L e s l ie  Zeigler, "Personal Existence: A Study of Buber and 
Kierkegaard, " Journal of Religion 40 (April 1960):89.
-17-
the Goethe Prize in 1951. ^
»
For Buber, man is not just a question. In the dialogical
O 1
wholeness of his existence he is also the answer. His emphasis is 
on the "meaning and hope that arises out of human existence, that 
develop out of the interhuman. " For Buber, human nature is not 
fixed; it is constantly changing and growing through knowing and 
doing. ^
Buber was not primarily a theologian but Paul Tillich saw him
as making three important contributions to Protestanism:
his existential interpretation of prophetic religion, his r e ­
discovery of mysticism as an element within prophetic 
religion, and his understanding of the relation between 
prophetic religion and culture, especially in the social and 
political realms. * 22 *
Sister Helen James .John regarded Buber's faith in the Bible 
as heretical "in the pristine etymological sense. " It allowed him to 
"distinguish, and so to choose, in the Old Testament, between the 
human and the divine, " between that which had been "manufactured "
p n
Meyer Levin, "The Sage Who Inspired Hammarskjold, " The 
New York Times Magazine, December 3, 1961, p. 42.
2 1John Steffney, "Heidegger and Buber: Ontology and Philoso­
phical Anthropology, " Religion in Life 43 (Spring 1974):36.
22Ibid., pp. 38-9.
2 SPaul Tillich, "Martin Buber and Christian Thought, " 
Commentary, June 1948, p. 516.
-18-
and that which was "received.
"The real worth of Buber, " a letter to the editor of The 
Commonweal confided, "lies in the fact that he can communicate what- 
he has met, and he does find a way. " He uses the language "as if he 
used it not" to express a knowledge which might not be understood
o c
without him. D
"Martin Buber, " said Will Herberg, "is one of the great 
creative forces in contemporary religion. In a day when Israel 
has remained on the front pages of world news "it is valuable to read 
what the Professor of Social Philosophy at the Hebrew University has 
had to say. " In addition to his own writings he has had "immense 
influence upon such diverse thinkers as the late L. H. Myers, Denis 
de Rougement, Father d'Arcy, Eric Przywara, Arnold Zweig and 
Paul Tillich. " * 257
Potok points out that the "Jews, however, have generally 
continued to look upon his efforts with suspicion and to regard them as
2 4Helen James John, "Eichmann and Buber, " The Commonweal, 
July 6, 1962, p. 375.
25Bernard E. Gilgun, The Commonweal, August 20, 1958,
p. 546.
^ W i l l  Herberg, "Buber: Philosopher of the Dialogic Life, "
The New Republic, January 16, 1956, p. 26.
2 7
Anne Fremantle, "Martin Buber, " The Commonweal, August 
6, 1948, p. 404.
-19-
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outside the mainstream of Jewish thought. He considered that
Buber's understanding of Judaism was "colored" by his relation with
Christianity. -Although he did not embrace Christianity, he regarded
Jesus as having realized the I-Thou relation. His choosing of Jesus
rather than Moses as his example in this regard brought him under
2 Qsuspicion by the Jewish Community. It is hardly surprising, Potok 
points out, that "neo-Orthodox Protestant theologians are among 
Buber's most ardent admirers. In fact, he states without reserva­
tion that "Buber has been condemned or ignored by Orthodox Jews.  ̂
One of the strong criticisms leveled against Buber was written 
by Potok.
Given Buber's inability to comprehend the nature and meaning 
of Jewish law, his existentialist orientation, his attitude 
toward Jesus, and his view of Judaism as refracted through the 
prism of Christian mysticism, it is perfectly understandable 
that his work is regarded with suspicion by contemporary Jews. 
But there is nevertheless a bitter irony in the fact that the 
great philosopher of dialogue is today virtually incapable of 
entering into dialogue with his own people. ^
Newsweek recognized Buber for his many honors including the 
Erasmus Award in 1963 and the Freedom of Jerusalem Award. He *29
2 8 nChaim Potok, "Martin Buber and the Jews. " Commentary, 
March 1966, p. 43.
29Ibid. , p. 46.
29Ibid. , p. 48.
2 ^Ibid., p. 48.
Ibid., p. 49.
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was nominated for the Nobel Prize by Hermann Hesse who called him 
"one of the few wise men" Living at that time. T. S. Eliot said of his 
meeting with Buber that it was "the rare experience of being in the 
presence of greatness.
Literature Related to the Problem 
of Evil and the Individual
"in I and Thou Buber's affinities with existentialism are
obvious, " wrote Malcom Diamond. ^4
But his thought has interacted intimately with the world - 
affirming tradition of Judaism, which has always cautioned 
its adherents against over-anxious preoccupation with sin, 
so that it stands in sharp contrast to the anguished emphasis 
of most existentialists. Compared to their views, Buber's 
outlook, which might seem pessimistic from the standpoint 
of rationalism, is quite optimistic. ^
This author comments on the evil of the I-It as used by Buber. 
"The It posture becomes evil when it oversteps its limits and claims 
to encompass the totality of truth. " This action becomes evil because 
it tends to choke off "the possibility of response to the deeper Levels of
Q O
meaning that may emerge from I-Thou encounters.
He defends Buber against critics who "accused him of employ­
ing anthropomorphic arguments" in an attempt to "shore up religious 34
'^Newsweek, June 28, 1965, p. 76.
34Diamond, Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist, p. I !).
3 5
' Ibid., p. 19.
36Ibid., p. 22.
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dogma. " Buber, he points out, "stands apart from apologetic theology, 
not only in his drive to eschew objective demonstration" and to confine 
himself to "existential evocation" but also in the "over-all consistency 
of his outlook.
Diamond admits that Buber is vulnerable to one charge, that of 
irrationalism. "He has failed to elaborate the sense in which detached
knowledge, gained in the I-It attitude, may enrich the meaning con-
( , o o
veyed within the I-Thou relation.
Beek supports Buber's concept of man and his relation to his
world by suggesting it
worth considering whether Buber is not right when he relates 
man and world to each other in such a way that only with man, 
who distances himself from his Merk-Welt (which he also 
has), does a world arise as something self-subsistent over 
against him.
Beek and Weiland attempt to clarify Buber's contrasting of 














37Ibid. , p. 44.
38Ibid. , p. 35.
'^Beek and Weiland,
4 0 . ,Ib id ., p. 58.




Manfred Vogel in the Harvard Theological Review denies that 
Buber's concepts of good and evil are foundation stones for his ethical 
thought. He sees them as "secondary concepts" in that "they receive 
their meaning and significance from the primary concept, i. e. , the 
concept of responsibility. He adds, however, that "Buber's ethics
is embedded in his ontology of relation, specifically of the I-Thou 
relation. One wonders if Mr. Vogel was unable to understand that 
it is exactly here in relation (specifically, the lack of it) that the 
ontology of evil is discovered in the writings of Buber.
Gabriel Schonfeld, in his critique of Arthur Cohen's book,
Martin Buber, missed the heart of Buber's concept of evil. If man 
can overcome his selfish tendencies to relate exclusively to other 
'things', and learn to relate harmoniously to his fellow human beings 
and to nature itself, he can achieve salvation. It is not man's 
relation to things that is evil but the way man relates to things. 
Schonfeld's reference to "other things" reveals a basic lack of under­
standing of Buber's stancer Man is no thing, even as other men are *41
Manfred Vogel, "The Concept of Responsibility in the Thought 
of Martin Buber, " Harvard Theological Review 63 (April 1970): 162.
49 Ibid. , p. 165.
43
Gabriel B. Schonfeld, "The Philosopher, " Saturday Review
41 (June 7, 1958):19.
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not things. When man learns to see others as subjects in the way man 
sees himself as a subject, he is capable of entering the I-Thou relation.
An almost unintelligible comment is made by Eli Burkow of the 
Jewish Institute of Religion when he says that "Martin Buber is forever 
acrobatic enough to leap over, or squeeze behind, the weighty 
intellectual formula. One is made to wonder if Mr. Burkow is able 
to see Dr. Buber at all as he "dances" among the issues.
Joseph Blau comes to the heart of it when he comments on 
Mamre. Essays in Religion by Buber. Blau states "Between man and 
man the relationship should be bi-subjective; but another man can be, 
and often, in our daily life, is, transformed from a Thou to an it_. " 
"There is no evil in itself," states Blau, "There is only a 'so-called 
evil' , a 'directionless power' which can become real evil only if it is
A O
chosen by individual human beings. " D
Gershom Scholem took to task the man Buber for what Scholem 
regarded as a misrepresentation of Hasidism. "Although a keen 
student of Hasidic literature. . . He combines quotations as suits his 
purpose. " In this manner, Buber presents the Hasidic movement "as 456
44 n mEli Burkow, Buber and Hasidism, Com men fa ry, February
1963, p. 161.
45Joseph L. Blau, review of Mamre. Essays in Religion, by 
Martin Buber, in Jewish Social Studies, 13 April 1956, p. 398.
46Ib id . , p. 399.
-24-
a spiritual phenomenon and not as a historical one. Scholem says
he ignores the material which does not interest him and interprets
4 Swhat he does choose to his own liking. Hasidim did not demand a 
joy in the "here and now, " as Buber suggests. It was what was hidden 
in the here and now. The Hasidic dicta expresses quite a different 
mood.
They do not teach us to enjoy life as it is; rather they do 
advise-nay enjoin-man to extract, I may even say distill, 
the perpetual life of God out of life as it is. It is not the 
fleeting Here and Now that is to be enjoyed but the ever­
lasting unity and presence of Transcendence. ^
In fact, Scholem says, "Too much is left out in his presentation
of Hasidism, while what has been included is overloaded with highly
personal speculations.
In contrast, Louis Newman says that Buber "has proved the 
outstanding evangel of the mysticism and ethico-religious literature 
of the remarkable east European movement known as Hasidism.
Aubrey Hodes provides what he chooses to call An Intimate 
Portrait of Martin Buber. Among the instances related by Hodes is
4 7 uGershom Scholem, "Martin Buber's Hasidism, " Commentary,
August 1961, p. 306.
48tk., Ibid. , P- 306.
49T, .. Ibid. , P- 312.
50.,., Ibid., P- 316.
51T . Louis I. Newman, "Book Reviews, " Jewish Social Studies,
2 October 1962, p. 142.
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a gathering in a house in Tel Aviv. Here Buber said "the basic evil of 
our time" is the "separation between our awareness that the eternal 
values were still valid and our desire to obtain a temporary advan­
tage. "52
An excellent contribution to the influence upon Buber is found
in Claude Tresmontant's book entitled A Study of Hebrew Thought.
It is characteristic of Hebrew thought, as opposed to Greek 
and Western thought, that it is not troubled by Negative ideas 
of nothingness and disorder. Hebrew thought is not haunted by 
the idea of an original void that should be there 'by rights' and 
that has to be overcome, or of a disorder, a chaos, that has 
to be mastered, because its threatening presence might under­
mine reality. In the beginning stands, not void, but Him 
whose name is: 1 am, YHVH. . . . ^
Maurice Friedman discussed at length the problem of evil in 
Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue. "Buber's system of valuing is so 
closely connected with the problem of evil that this problem can be used 
as a unifying centre for his work without doing injustice to the mam- 
different fields in which he has written. He saw value for Buber 
as nothing more or less than the decision as to what is good and evil
CL R
and the attitude one takes toward avoiding or transforming evil. 5234*
52Aubrey Hodes, Martin Buber: An Intimate Portrait (New 
York: The Viking Press), p. 31.
53
Claude Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Thought, trans. 
Michael Francis Gibson (New York: Desclee, 1960), p. 48.
54Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 12.
"’ "’ibid., p. 11.
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Traditionally, the problem of evil has been limited to the 
fields of metaphysics and theology. In our use of it it must 
be broadened to include other important phases of human 
life--philosophical anthropology, ethics, psychology, social 
philosophy, and even politics. This does not mean a change 
in the problem itself so much as a shift of emphasis and a 
greater ^concern with its concrete applications in the modern 
world.
Friedman identified four types of evil of which the modern age 
is particularity aware:
The loneliness of modern man before an unfriendly universe 
and before men whom he associates with but does not meet; 
the increasing tendency for scientific instruments and 
techniques to outrun man's ability to integrate those techniques 
into his life in some meaningful and constructive way; the inner 
duality of which modern man has become aware through the 
writings of Dostoevsky and Freud and the development of 
psychoanalysis; and the deliberate and large-scale degrada­
tion of human life within the totalitarian state.
Friedman traces the change in Buber's attitude toward evil
from a tendency to regard evil in largely negative terms to ascribe to
it "greater and greater emotional and ontological reality. " It was
always between unreality and the radical reality of evil that his
58position has been found; he never considered evil an absolute.
For Buber as for the Baal-Shem, evil is no essence but a 
lack-the throne of the good, the 'shell' which surrounds and 
disguises the essence of things. Though negative, evil is real 
and must be redeemed through the wholeness and purity of 
man's being. *589
'^Ibid. , p. 12. 
9^Ibid., p. 13.
58Ibid., p. 14.
59Ibid. , p. 30.
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Friedman sees the essence of evil in the thought of Buber as 
the failure to direct one's inner power. This direction which one 
may choose in bringing evil into good must be chosen in the realization 
of "divine freedom and unconditionality. " This act of decision in its 
intensive stage is called Teshuvah (turning). ^  Buber never changed 
his belief in a redemption "which accepts all the evil of real life and 
transforms it into the good. "DZ
Abraham E d e l^  in his review of Professor Friedman's book 
praises it as "a comprehensive exposition. " The book, Edel says, 
brings out fundamental ideas "clearly and in considerable detail.
He charges Friedman with not including what he calls a "critical
evaluation. " He would like to have seen a more critical treatment
64of Buber's approach to the problem of evil.
Literature Related to Buber's 
Concept of Community
Literature related to Buber's view of Community is consid­
erably less than that related to the individual. Two possible 60*4
60Ibid. , p. 32.
^Ibid. , p. 33.
*^Ibid. , p. 39.
6 3Department of Philosophy, City College, New York.
64Abraham Edel, "The Curtain Around Us, " review of Marlin 
Buber: The Life of Dialogue, by Maurice Friedman, in Review,
1 September 1956, p. 183.
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explanations may be offered for this, (1) It is possible to write and 
teach in such a way as to change the concepts an individual may have 
toward himself, and (2) Man may have lost confidence in his ability to 
change the larger Community.
Buber lived to see the experiment which he thought to be the 
ideal begin to fade. William Miller in his review On Judaism by 
Buber said:
To Buber as a Zionist, the creation of the state of Israel had 
as its aim far more than providing a haven for the victims of 
Hitlerism or of the Slavic pogroms. The only way to eradi­
cate anti-Semitism, said Buber, is for the Jew to demon­
strate a better way. . . . Buber was dismayed by the dimin­
ution of faith, by the 'terrifying' assimilation of Jewish nation­
hood into the 'wolf-pack' of predatory nations, for he saw the , 
spirit of Israel as 'the spirit of realizatior^capable of setting 
a powerful and holy example to the world.
This is not to suggest that Buber gave up hope, rather the 
opposite. He was, according to Miller, "a bearded sage who con­
fronted the world in all its complexity, neither with tragic resignation
nor facile optimism but with a tough temerity of an imperishable and
n6 Tillusionless hope.
W illiam  Lynch, in his review of Arthur Cohen's book, Mart.in 
Buber thought that at least "Buber's genius can be used to help *6
65
Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Boston: 
Beacon Press 1949), p. 149.
6 6William Robert Miller, "A Personalistic Philosophy of Hope, 
Saturday Review 51 (February 10, 1968):34.
67Ib id . , p, 34.
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'supernaturalists1 to realize that salvation cannot be achieved save in
relation to the human community.
Reinhold Niebuhr saw a limitation in the thought of Buber: "his
inability to comprehend the moral mediocrities of collective loyalties
of races and nations. " The idea that a Jewish homeland could be
established "without creating enmity with the circumambient Arab
world" was to Niebuhr a misjudgement. He saw Buber's "only error
was to underestimate the ethnic core of all parochial communities,
including the old and new nations.
Jack Cohen in his review of Malcom Diamond's book, Martin
Buber: Jewish Existentialist said:
While it is true that Buber himself sees his philosophy as an 
integrated whole, many of us who admire his analysis of the 
human situation and his appeal for genuine community among 
men cannot square this appeal with his flights into the 
theological stratosphere. ‘ ®
In reviewing the same book by Diamond, Gabriel Vahanian
emphasizes that "it is Buber's conviction, as Mr. Diamond sums it up,
that 'the ideal of Zion must not be subordinated' or accommodated to
71'the political exigencies of a Jewish state'. " *69701
^W il l iam  F. Lynch, America, March 22, 1958, p. 729.
69 i iReinhold Niebuhr, "Martin Buber: In Memoriam, " Saturday
Review 48 (July 24, 1965):37.
70Jack J. Cohen, Jewish Social Studies 23 (June 1964):129.
71
Gabriel Vahanian, The Nation, July 2, 1960, p. 16.
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In Paul Tillich's mind Buber did not believe the ideal existed
In the world system but that the world should be hallowed, nevertheless.
Religion, for Hasidism as well as for Buber, is consecration 
of the world. It is neither acceptance of the world as it is, nor 
a by-passing the world in the direction of a transcendent divine, 
but it is consecration in the double sense of seeing the divine 
spark in ev^ything created and acting to realize the divine in 
everything.
Tillich pointed out that Buber was always in a special position
to Zionism because "He affirmed it as a messianic attempt to create
Gemeinschaft, while he negated it as a political attempt to create a
state. " Tillich added that history seems to show that without the shell
73of a state, a community cannot exist.
Ronald Smith says that Buber calls for true political activity 
which is man's turning to man "in the context of creation. " This is 
man's responsibility and "cannot be evaded. " It is here intimated 
that even if man should not achieve it, his responsibility is the same. 
And it is just this responsibility that Buber sets forth in his concept 
of community.
V. V. Ramana Murti calls attention to the fact that even when 
Buber was engaged in political activity for the Zionist cause, he did not
72Paul Tillich, "Martin Buber in Christian Thought, 
Commentary, June 1948, p. 519. 734
73Ibid., p. 521.
74
Ronald Gregor Smith, "The Religion of Martin Buber, 
Theology Today 12 (July 1955):215.
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join any political party. "He felt strongly that parties might lose 
their concern with 'ideas' and sacrifice them for political ends. "7'̂
An editorial in Time magazine calls attention to the fact that 
Ruber was often in conflict with Israel's policies, including greater 
attempts to make peace with the Arabs. In March 1962, Ben-Gurion 
visited Buber and listened to his arguments against the death of 
Eichmann. "Society is merely a group of persons, " argued Buber, 
"and when it kills one man, it kills a part of itself. "7^
Buber was not opposed to systems as John Steffney points out 
in his excellent work "Heidegger and Buber: Ontology and Philoso­
phical Anthropology. " * 767 78* He saw system as having value "as long as 
the systematic thinker realizes his position as a mode of abstract­
ing. . .as long as he realizes that his system is always the substitu­
tion of an 'It' for a 'Thou'. "7^
What Buber opposed was the tendency to allow systems to 
dominate man. For instance, he saw the purpose of religious ritual
"to create in man that life-giving presence of God. " When this did
7 0not take place Buber saw it as not only worthless but dangerous.
V. V. Ramana Murti, Buber's Dialogue and Gandhi's 
Satyagraha, " Journal of Historic Ideas 34 (October 1968):612.
76Time, March 23, 1962.
77Religion in Life 43 (Spring 1974):33-41.
78Ibid. , p. 41.
7 9R. Grant, "Dialogue, " Commentary, September 1 966, p. 20.
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It was this danger which caused Buber to oppose both the 
collectivist and authoritarian state in his social philosophy; it deper­
sonalizes the individual. This concept is delineated in Potok's work 
on 'Martin Buber and the Jews.
Norman Cousins, who edits the Saturday Review, tells of an 
interview with Buber. In this question-answer period, Buber says 
that "the world's statesmen and political leaders" cannot be counted 
on "to define the problem and then meet it. " They are too involved in 
the "give-and-take of national rivalries that the larger question of 
human destiny is overlooked. " He expressed what seemed almost 
despair:
There is one hope, Professor Buber observed. It is for 
people to become aware. Nothing can be done without aware­
ness. With it, anything is possible. If people know and think 
and feel, they can talk and act and give leadership to their 
leaders. . . .You must never stop thinking about it, never 
stop working for it, he said. Talk, write, act. 82
This concept of present action is underscored by Friedman in
his interpretation of Buber's concept of history. True history "can
only be understood through our participation in it--through its becoming
alive for us as Thou. " This, Friedman says is because subject -object
history "cannot adequately understand events because the I of the *81
O Q
' Commentary, March 1966, p. 47.
81Norman Cousins, "Talk, Write, Act, " The Saturday Review 
40 (March 23, 1957):20.
82Ibid., p. 20.
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historian is that of the disinterested spectator" while the persons of 
whom he writes are "usually treated as It's rather than Thou's.
In his "Personal Freedom and Community Responsibility" 
Charles McCarthy represents Buber's concept of community "not so 
much from the effort of individuals to meet one another as persons, as 
from their effort to enter into a meaningful relationship with the 
living, self-giving God. As commendable as the effort is, Mr. 
McCarthy has placed a wrong balance on the matter of community. It 
is just through such human relationships that one follows the extended 
lines to where the eternal Thou intersects all human relationships. 
Buber emphasizes that the longing for relation is primary; true 
community, howevex-, is built upon the dual concept of man's relation 
to each other member of the community plus all members' relation­
ship to a living center. The relation of the center does not of itself 
produce community.
Friedman, in his Life of Dialogue, has set forth an interpreta­
tion of Buber's concept of community.
Buber has defined evil as the predominance of the would of It 
to the exclusion of relation, and he has conceived of the 
redemption of evil as taking place in the primal movement
^Maurice  Friedman, "Symbol, Myth, and History in the 
Thought of Martin Buber, " The Journal of Religion 34 (.lanuar-y 
1954) :9 — 10.
°^The Catholic World, p. 167.
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of the turning which brings man back to God and back to 
solidarity of relation with man and the world.
It is the entering into relationship "that, makes man really
man;" it is the failure to enter this relationship which constitutes evil.
"Thus at the heart of Buber's philosophy the problem of evil and the
nP fiproblem of man merge into one. ° Our belief in the external world
o n
comes from our relation to others. It is only "when I step into 
elemental relationship with the other that the other becomes present 
for me. This Buber calls personate Vergegenwartigung or the "making
f|oo
present the person of the other.
Friedman also distinguishes the divergence of thought between 
Buber's social and political principles. The former relates to the 
dialogical while the later means "the necessary and ordered realm of 
the world of It.
In evaluating the work Society and Solitude by Nicholas 
Berdyaev, Friedman points out that Berdyaev has incorporated the 
I-Thou philosophy but without a clear understanding of Buber's concept 
of the "between. " This lack of understanding leads to a lack of
^Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 76.
88Ibid. , p. 101.
8^Ibid. , p. 164.
88Ibid., p. 171.
89
Ibid. , p. 210.
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emphasis on the relation of man to man in the true community. ^  He 
charges the same error to Gogarten in his work Ich Glaube an den 
dreieinigen Gott for he makes reality within individuals rather than 
between them.
Other works which do not involve directly the total concepts of 
Buber in the idea of community but which would contribute to the 
readers' understanding of modern attempts to apply the community 
concepts include the following works.
92Finding Community by W. Ron Jones proposes (and carried 
the thesis forward in a commendable manner) to help the student 
understand how well existing institutions serve the needs of the people.
Strategies of Community Organization edited by Fred Cox and 
others1̂  is a book of readings, some of which touch on the fringes of 
the true community concept. It's value rests in supplying the neces­
sary organizational "shell" which Buber allows while at the same 
time affords helpful contrasts to the nature in which true community 
must arise.
90Ibid. , p. 271.
91 Ibid. , p. 273.
92A Guide to Community Research and Action, (Palo Alto 
California: James Freeland Associates, 1971).
93' A Book of Readings, (Itasca, III. : Peacock Publishers, Inc. ,
1970).
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Two other texts include The New Community Organization'^
q c
and The Community in America: Both provide insights into present
ways in which community theory is being applied and furnish a back 
drop of activity for the social and political theory of Buber.
Literature Related to Buber's 
Educational Theory
"Education means a 'conscious and willed1 selection by man of
Qthe effective world. ' " aD The most essential act for the teacher is
that he "experience the pupil from the other side. "
If this experiencing is quite real and concrete, it removes 
the danger that the teacher's will to educate will degenerate 
into arbitrariness. This 'inclusiveness' is of the essence of 
the dialogical relation, for the teacher sees the position of 
the other in his concrete actuality yet does not lose sight of 
his own. ^
Friedman points out that the old authoritarian theory of 
education "does not understand the need for freedom and spontaneity. 
However, the new "freedom-centered educational theory misunder­
stands the meaning of freedom. " Freedom is indispensable to 
education but is "not in itself sufficient. " One must understand that
94Arthur Dunham, The New Community Organization (New 
York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1970).
95
Roland Leslie Warren, The Community in America, (Chicago: 
Rand McNally & Co., 1963).
96Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 176.
97Ibid., p. 177.
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the "opposite of compulsion is not freedom but communion.
Just what this attitude toward the education of character means 
in practice is best shown by Buber's own application of it to 
adult education. He conceives of adult education not as an 
extension of the professional training of the universities but 
as a means of creating a certain type of man demanded by a 
certain historical situation. ^
Buber is rightly interpreted by Friedman when it is pointed out 
that a child must "find for himself his own world. " It is not ready­
made for him.
The fact that he can realize what is over against him as Thou 
is based on the a priori of relation, that is, the potentiality of 
relation which exists between him and the world. Through 
this meeting with the Thou he gradually becomes I. ^00
Having discovered himself, the child then must begin the
process of selecting his effective world. His inner powers must be
guided toward the selection of the right path. It is "just this failure
to direct one's inner power which is the inmost essence of evil.
Zeigler says "Buber holds that truth is a matter not of
appropriation. . .but of participation or sharing in being. "102 This
concept of the between is seen by Zeigler as Buber's attempt to find









Leslie Zeigler, "Personal Existence: A Study of Buber and 
Kierkegaard, " Journal of Religion 40 (April 1960):89.
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a "genuine third alternative between individualism and collectivism. 1,1 ^
o
There is no room in hiswiew for personal knowledge, that is, 
knowledge attained in personal encounter or relation. Buber 
does not grant that one may know another person in direct 
relation to him without "possessing" him or making him into . 
an object. His I-Thou relation upon which the philosophy of 
dialogue is built does not give us knowledge of that to which 
we become related. We can only meet that which remains 
undisclosed. Knowledge is reserved for the realm of I-It. 
ironically, it is that for which Buber's philosophy is perhaps 
most widely acclaimed--the direct knowledge of persons 
attained by personal encounter— that his philosophy denies. * 1 ®̂
Helen James John in "Eichmann and Buber: A message of
responsibility" said:
The message that truly human existence finds its roots only 
in responsibility in the deepest sense of that word--the 
response of man, in all the situations of his life, to the claim
laid upon him by his fellow man, 
him, and by God.
by the Truth which confronts
Van Meter Ames calls attention to the Educational Philosophy
of Buber by saying
Buber learned wisdom from Hasidism. . .drawing strength 
from brotherly sharing, from the creative relation between 
leaders and others, in which each became his brother's 
keeper without relieving anyone of responsibility for himself 
or for others. The individual became authentically a person 
in dealing with his neighbor, the community, and the natural 




1 OSThe Commonweal, July 6, 1962, p. 374.
1 ®^Van Meter Ames, "Buber and Mead, " Antioch Review 27 
(Summer 1967):183.
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Carolyn Shaffer identified the goal of education in Buber's
thought as "the achievement of an intimate relationship with God.
This is the goal of life and although it is a religious one, it is reached
by a secular path; that path is the affirmation of the whole of reality of
earthly being. "But one is called upon not only to affirm the natural
world but also to transform it and offer it up to God.
Helen Wodehouse in her "Threefold Work of Martin Buber" said-
Martin Buber has been pre-eminently a teacher. He has 
never set easy tasks to his unspecialized readers; he has 
required their full attention; but, without compromise, he 
has done his best to enable them to read with under­
standing. . . . When he returns repeatedly to the same 
subject, one can feel working the double motive of the 
teacher: 'Try looking at it this way' and 'I believe that now 
I have seen it better and can make it clearer. ^
Wodehouse calls attention to the statement of Dr. Greta Hort
in her introduction to Mamre: "We have 'Professoren und Pastoren1
but few 'Lehrer. ' ^
Donald Moore called attention to the concept that Buber be­
lieved that no path was unalterably defined. " When in 1948 the 
fighting and its outcome blocked his plan for a solution, he accepted
107 Carolyn R. Shaffer, "A Jewish View of Redemption, " The 
Commonweal, August 22, 1969, p. 513.
^^Helen Wodehouse, "The Threefold Work of Martin Buber, 
The Fortnightly 173 (May 1950):331.
109Ibid., p. 331.
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the new state as a fact of history and looked to other possibilities. J 1U 
Perhaps no other incident could better illustrate the consistency of his 
educational philosophy.
Roland Gittelsohn, in his article "Hosannas from a Hallowed
Few" summed up three tenents in Hasidism which drew Buber to it.
In these, Gittelsohn sees the outline of Buber's philosophy including
his philosophy of life and education.
First, its experiential quality--the fact that it. . . 'is not a 
category of teaching, but one of life. . . . ' Second, Buber 
likes the fact that the fait of the Hasidim encompassed the 
whole of life. . . . The third magnet attractin^Buber to 
Hasidism is its approval of the simple man.
112Norman Mailer cites "The Story of the Cape" and then 
points out that the "existential premise is that we learn only from 
situations in which the end is unknown. " Said in another way: "man 
learns more about the nature of water by jumping into the surf than 
by riding a boat.
John Steffney in "Heidegger and Buber: Ontology and Philoso­
phical Anthropology" says
* ^Donald J. Moore, "Martin Buber: Friend of the Court, 
America, February 27, 1971, p. 232.
** Roland B. Gittelsohn, "Hosannas from a Hallowed Few, 
Saturday Review 43 (June 4, 1960):16. 1
1 12 Martin Buber, Tales of the Hasidim: The Early Masters, 
trans. Olga Marx (New York: Shocken Books, 1947), p. 268.
113Norman Mailer, "Response and Reactions, " Commentary, 
June 1963, p. 518.
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Bub er is forever reminding us of the risks of existence. . . 
but he also places emphasis on a reasonable amount of 
certitude that allows man to continue walking the narrow 
ridge. . . I f  there were no certitude at all, there would be no 
meaning to life. . . But because of meaning. . . we can exist 
in a state of hope for more of that which is meaningful. 1 ] ^
Buber's emphasis, Steffney says, is not on "fundamental
ontology" (the structure of man's being) or on the broader sense of
Ontology (The Structure of Being), "but rather on the meaning and
hope that arises out of human existence, that develop out of the inter -
u mi 1 5human.
On the matter of responsibility Vogel poses the question 
"Responsibility for what?" Buber provides one and only one answer,
1 i  n
"one has the responsibility for responding.
Summary
Much of the literature concerning Martin Buber deals with him 
as total man with few works concentrating upon his philosophy apart 
from other areas on which he has written or spoken. There is a 
strong emphasis on the matter of personal relationship, possibly in­
fluenced by the most acclaimed of his works I and Thou. For Buber, 1
1 1 ^John Steffney, Heidegger and Buber, "Ontology and 
Philosophical Anthropology, " Religion in Life 43 (Spring 1974):37.
1l5Ibid., p. 38.
116°Manfred Vogel, "The Concept of Responsibility in the 
Thought of Martin Buber, " Harvard Theological Review 63 (April
1 9 7 0): 1 6 3 - 4.
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the concept of community was of equal importance for this was the end 
toward which the matter of personal relation was to lead. One cannot 
understand the educational philosophy of the man unless it is realized 
that education was to have as its goal not only the development of the 
individual but through this medium also the development of true
community.
CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STUDY 
The Problem of Evil
Jean-Paul Sartre polarized the world into good and evil, only 
to discover that those poles were slipperty to a degree that excluded 
stability. * He found it difficult to sort the world into the fixed
O
categories of good and evil. The search for a clear distinction 
between good and evil is not an easy one, even for the philosopher.
Martin Buber did not view good and evil as two structurally 
similar qualities located at opposite poles, but "two qualities of 
totally different structure.
Frederick Von Schlegel, a German philosopher of the nineteenth 
century, wrote "Man is placed in this world on his trial and for a 
struggle with evi l"  and that if evil were to be destroyed, "the living 1
1 Joseph H. McMahon, Human Beings: The World of dean-Panl 
Sartre (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), p, 237.
2Ibid. , p. 272.
3
Martin Buber, Good and Evil (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1952), p. 64.
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development of nature" would be "cut short. He saw evil as neces­
sary in order to provide man a proving ground or arena in which he 
could develop. Buber saw evil in the world as being latent in the 
nature of things. Thus, the knowledge of good and evil is nothing more 
than the "cognizance of the opposites" which include "the fortune and 
misfortune or the order and the disorder which is experienced by a 
person, as well as that which he causes. "
The Russian philosopher, Nicolas Berdyaev, held that the 
positive meaning of evil lies "solely in the enrichment of life brought
. (g
about by the heroic struggle against it and the victory over it.
Sigmund Freud saw the negative element by which "there are present 
in all men destructive. . . trends and in a great number of people 
these are strong enough to determine their behavior in human 
society. Bertrand Russell said in "The Elements of Ethics, " I 
can discover no self-evident proposition as to the goodness or- badness 1
4
Frederick Von Schlegel, The Philosophy of L i fe , trans. A. J. 
W. Morrison (London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Covenant Garden, 
1847), p. 130.
’ Buber, Good and Evil, p. 73.
0
Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, quoted in The Nature 
of Man, Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1 971), pp. 282-3.
7
Sigmund Freud, quoted in The Nature of Man, Paul Edwards, 
ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 242.
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of all that exists or has existed or will exist. Flo continues by 
pointing out that "pain and hatred and envy and cruelty are surely 
things that exist, and are not merely the absence of their opposites. ui' 
Spinoza saw evil as only those things which hinder man from perfecting 
his reason and from enjoying a rational life. 8 910 12* Teilhard de Chardin 
thought it possible that "evil may go on growing alongside good, and 
it too may attain its paroxysm at the end in some specifically new 
form.
Chardin identifies the hierarchy of evil in the following manner: 
"To begin with we find physical lack-of-arrangement on the material 
level; then suffering. . . then, on a still higher level, wickedness and 
torture of spirit as it analyses itself and makes choices.
Buber saw that the recognition of opposites was a recognition 
of good and evil. Evil exists in the world only in so far as man knows 
about himself. That which is in the world which man gives the name 
evil is according to Buber, a "mirrored illusion. Chardin pointed
8Bertrand Russell, Philosophical Essays (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1966), p. 22.
9Ibid., p. 23.
^Joseph Ratner, ed. The Philosophy of Spinoza (New York:
The Modern Library, 1927), p. 287.
11
Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1959), p. 288.
12Ibid., p. 310.
1 3Buber, Good and Evil, p. 88.
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1 4out that there are no summits with abysses.
Evil and The Individual
'[’he 'Two-Fold Nature of Evil
There are two fundamental types of evil in the thought of Buber: 
(1) Evil from indecision, and (2) evil from decision. These two 
"apparently mutually exclusive aspects" show evil as an occurrence 
and evil as a deed. Together they reveal the constitution of evil 
because they are supplementary to one another rather than contradic­
tory. However, they are not supplementary to each other as two sides 
of an object but as "two stages or steps of a process. " 1 J
Evil is not confined to action. Action is only the "type of evil 
happening which makes evil manifest. " Such action does not stem 
primarily from decision but rather from indecision. Man can do good 
with his total being but evil cannot be done with the whole being. Evil 
is a lack of direction and that which is done in it and out of it "as the 
grasping, seizing, devouring, compelling, seducing, exploiting, 
humiliating, torturing and destroying of what offers itself. " 1 ®
Imagination and Evil
Evil as it reveals itself in man is the product of man's *16
1 4
Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 288.
^Buber, Good and Evil, pp. 119-20.
16Ib id . , p. 130.
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imagination. This is not the same as saying that imagination is evil,
it is rather to emphasize that the product of man's imagination is
evil. Man imagines that which is not and calls it real; he plays with
possibility and this possibility provides the ground-work from which
1 7self-temptation and violence springs.
It is not evil because it is imagined but, rather, it is evil 
because it takes the place of the real. The imagery does not spring 
from decision but is fabricated and devised. "Thus, from divine 
reality, which was allotted to him, " Buber says "he is driven out 
into the boundless possible, which he fills with his imaging, that is
. . 1  O
evil because it is fictitious.
However, it should not be supposed that imagination must be
or is entirely evil. Man does have the power to imagine the real, to
grasp the truth which is hidden behind the curtain or which is latent
in a painting yet unpainted. Imagination may be both evil and good
for out of indecision man does have the power to decide and from the
midst of a boundless imagination one can imagine that which is real.
"Straying and caprice are not innate in man" according to Buber, for
in spite of the burdens of past generations man "always begins anew 
ul 9as a person. *1
17Ibid. , p. 91.
 ̂"ibid. , pp. 91-2.
1 9Ibid., p. 93.
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The Evil Urge
There are two urges in man: (1) goodness and (2) evil. These 
two urges are present from the nature of his creation and can accom­
plish their best service for man only through genuine collaboration. 
The evil urge is "no less necessary than its companion, " for without 
it man would "beget no children, build no houses, engage in no 
economic activity.
The evil urge finds its great value and strongest expression in
the motivation of the individual. Man's rivalry with his neighbor
produces economic activity which is necessary but it is not necessary
that economic activity be evil. Only through man, who alone of all
earthly beings has the power of imagination, did the urge (which is
called the evil urge) become evil.
It became so, and continually becomes so, because man 
separates it from its companion and in this condition of 
independence makes an idol of precisely that which was 
intended to serve him. Man's task, therefore, is not toO 1
extirpate the evil urge, but to reunite it with the good.  ̂1
Evil and the Separation of Urges
Buber sees evil as it arises in the individual a result of the 
separation of the two urges. This separation has created a fragmen­
tation within the individual so that he tends to act in part, rather than
2DIbid., p. 94.
 ̂"' ibid. , p. 95.
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as a whole. A l l  evil done by man is accomplished with only a part of 
man's being. Good can be done with the whole being because man 
does have the capacity to pull together both urges into a single urge 
and become whole. In this state he is capable of decision; he is 
capable of "great love and great service. "
It is important to bear in mind that Buber does not conceive of
the evil and good urges as two diametrically opposite forces. The
evil urge must be recognized as passion, "without which he can neither
beget nor bring forth,, " but which, if left to itself, remains without
direction and leads astray. The good urge should be regarded as
"pure direction" which leads a man toward God. When these two are
united, the passion is then given direction. In no other way can man 
24become whole.
Unification vs. Evil
When Buber spoke of the unification of the soul it must be 
understood that he spoke not of some spiritual element within man but 
of the total man. He emphasized this by the following statement: "What 
is meant by unification of the soul would be thoroughly misunderstood 





24Ibid. , p. 97.
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spirit together.
What is the purpose of this unification? Certainly not for 
one's self alone. In the thought of Buber one may "begin with oneself 
but not to end with oneself; to start from oneself, but not to aim at 
oneself; to comprehend oneself, but not to be preoccupied with 
oneself. "* 26 27*9
Evil and The Two Worlds of Man
The purpose of the unification of the individual is the unifiea- 
tion of the world. Man lives in two worlds, the world of relation 
and the world of experience. He experiences the It world and enters 
into relation with the Thou world. Evil does not rest in the fact that 
an It-World exists, but in that man tends to treat everything as an It. 
"Without It a human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with
o o
that is not human. " ° The basic word I-It does not come from evil; 
it becomes evil when man "lets it have its way. "2®
Man cannot and should not attempt to dispense with the
2 9Martin Buber, The Way of Man According to the Teaching of 
Hasidism (Secaucus, New Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1966), p. 25.
26Ibid. . pp. 31-2.
27
Ibid. , p. 40.
23
Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufman (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), p. 85.
29' Ibid. , pp. 95-6.
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It-World. His will to profit and power are legitimate and natural.
The drive becomes evil only when it detaches itself from the "will to 
human relations. " At that point such drive becomes evil. 3®
Man creates evil in the It-World by learning to treat himself 
as an It. He ceases to speak of himself as a person. Rather he 
speaks "on his own behalf. " He is no longer an I. "The I spoken and 
written by him is the required subject of the sentences that convex 
his statements and orders--no more and no less.
Evil as failure to Become
When man becomes completely identified with the It-World he 
fails to fulfill the purpose for which he was created. The task of 
every man, according to the hasidic teaching which influenced the life 
of Martin Buber, is to "affirm for God's sake the world and himseLf 
and by this very means to transform both. It is seen that although 
Buber teaches that one should not "aim at himself" his teaching is 
certainly not one of self-negation.
There is something that can only be found in one place. It
is a great treasure, which may be called the fulfillment of
existence. The place where this treasure can be found is the
O Q
place on which one stands. °  301*
30Ibid. , p. 97.
31 Ibid., p. 118.
“"Buber, Way of Man, p. 6.
33Ibid. , p. 37.
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Buber suggests that man should not deny either the world or 
himself; his mission is to fulfill both. The It-World is evil only to the 
man who is bound to and by it. The It-World is not evil to the man who 
is free to step out of it again and again. ^  Every man's task is "the 
actualization of his unique, unprescendented and never-recuring poten­
tialities, and not the repetition of something that another. . .has 
achieved.
Evil from Indecision
In order for man to accomplish this given task he must decide. 
Indecision is the basic evil; to half-decide is to not decide at all. "if 
there were a devil he would not be the one who decided against God but 
he that in all eternity did not decide. Doubt is failure to choose,
n n
it is "unchoice, indecision. Out of it arises evil. "'3'
It is not sufficient, however, to decide. One must decide for 
something, for reality. These urges are per definitionem "directed 
toward something; but lack of direction is characteristic of the vortex 
revolving within itself. Fantasy is evil because it distracts from
divinely given reality and "plays with potentialities" so as to impose
'•54 Buber, I and Thou, p. 100.
^Buber, Way of Man, p. 16.
’̂ Buber, I and Thou, p. 101.
Buber, Good and Evil, p. 104.
38Ib id . , p. 126.
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"the form of indefiniteness upon the definiteness of the moment. " Thus, 
the substantial "threatens to be submerged in the potential.
"To unite the two urges" Buber said, is "to equip the absolute 
potency of passion with the one direction that renders it capable of 
great love and of great service. " In this uniting, and in no other way, 
can man become whole. 4®
Decision suggests the choosing of a path rather than a point.
The act of deciding is the choosing of the direction "toward the point 
of being at which. . .1 encounter the divine mystery of my created 
uniqueness. "4-*- Buber is constantly concerned with direction. With 
his whole being one may choose the path "for there is only one. " The 
other is a "setting out upon no path, pseudo-decision which is indeci-
Ision, flight into delusion and ultimately into mania.
Man repeatedly experiences the dimension of evil as indeci­
sion. The occurrences in which he experiences it, however, 
do not remain in his self-knowledge a series of isolated 
moments of non-decision. . .in self-knowledge these moments
d o
merge into a course of indecision, as it were a fixation in it. 
Failure to choose the right path is expressed as evil in the 
thought of Buber. Whereas a person can only truly choose the one
39t, . .  Ibid., pp., 125
40Ibid., P- 97.
41T, .  , Ibid., P- 142.
42T,Ibid. , P- 128.
43*  Ibid., P- 134.
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path, he may by a series of non-decisive moments develop a course 
of indecision to the extent that the choosing of "the path" becomes 
increasingly difficult. The selection of "the path" is not a choice 
between left and right but "the vortex of chaos and the spirit hovering 
above it. "44 If a man chooses the way of the spirit, he chooses the 
way of relationship which leads to the Thou who is the "wholly 
Other. "45 Conversely, indecision begins a chain or path which begins 
with action apart from deciding.
Evil from Choice
In the first stage man does not choose, he merely acts; in 
the second he chooses himself, in the sense of his heing- 
constituted-thus or having become-thus. The first stage does 
not yet contain a "radical evil ;"  whatever misdeeds are 
committed, their commission is not a doing of the deed but a 
sliding into it. In the second stage evil grows radical, be­
cause what man finds in himself is willed. . . "4®
At this point man finds himself doing what is evil out of choice, 
albeit not with his whole soul. It is a path which leads into a confir­
mation of evil. "Intensification and confirmation of indecision is deci­
sion to evil. "4? It is not a process a man can break at any point he 
desires, but may find that at the critical moment the control has been 4*7
44Ibid. , p. 128.
45Ruber, I and Thou, p. 79.
Buber, Good and Evil, p. 140.
47Ibid. , p. 88.
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withdrawn from him. ^
Discovering Evil
Buber distinguishes between a state of the soul in which it 
proposes good and one in which it does not. The contrast is not be­
tween a good and a bad disposition, but "between a disposition to do 
good and its absence.
Good and evil (what Buber refers to as the yes and no positions) 
can never be coexistent in man although the knowledge of these posi­
tions may be within his cognizance.
He knows oppositeness only by his situation within it; and
that means defacto (since the yes can present itself to the
experience and perception of man in the no-position, but not
the no in the yes-position). ^
"At this point the process of the human soul becomes a process
. . C O
in the world; the opposites which are latent in the soul break out 
into reality and become existent. ^  A man knows factually what is 
evil only as he discovers himself, and about himself. "Self-perception
48Martin Buber, Two Types of Faith: A Study of the Interpreta­
tion of Judaism and Christianity, trans. Norman Goldhawk (New York: *4950
Harper & Row, 1961), p. 84.
49' Buber, Good and Evil, p. 87.
50Ib id ., p. 75.
^Ibid . , p. 75.
Ibid., p. 76.
5,3Ibid. , p. 76.
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11̂4and self-relationship are peculiarly human.
"The lie is the specific evil which man has introduced into 
nature. . . the lie is our very own invention, different in kind from 
every deceit that the animals can produce. The lie was possible 
only after man came on the world scene. Only when man became 
capable of conceiving the truth was a lie possible. Man alone is able 
to place what is false into the understanding of his fellow and convince 
him that it is truth. Man is able to recognize the lie only after he has 
come to perceive truth.
The Task of Self-Unification
How does one extract himself from the whirling chaos and 
begin to choose the path of relationship? Buber does not present a 
simple method by which one may select white or black, right or left. 
The soul has the option of "clutching at any object, past which the 
vortex happens to carry it, and cast its passion upon it" and so begin 
a path of no-choice. Or, the soul can "in response to a prompting 
that is still incomprehensible to itself" set out on the "audacious work" 
of self-unification.
In the former case, it exchanges an undirected possibility
for an undirected reality, in which it does what it wills not
° 4Ib id ., p. 88.
'^Ibid. , p. • 7.
D6Ibid., p. 127.
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to do, what is preposterous to it, the alien, the ’’evil;" in the
later, if the work meets with success the soul has given up
undirected plenitude in favor of the one taut string, the one
stretched beam of direction. If the work is not successful. . .
it becomes aware of direction, becomes aware of itself as
57sent in quest of it.
> ) . ... . •
Summary
Evil arises in the individual primarily from indecision. This 
lack of decision results in imagining the unreal, causing man to aim 
at what is not. In his aiming for the unreal, man. fal,ls prey to error 
of many kinds for he reaches for that which is convenient rather than 
for a willed path. The primary task of man is to decide. In order to 
do this he must unite the evihurge with the good, for decision can be
• t . . . • i * - it* 1 • 1
made only with the total being.
; :< i n s - i n , • • - * * • •'  ■ 1 -
Evil and the Community
Martin Buber believed that society needed to undergo a drastic 
renewal. Like man, society also has purpose. "The people is not a 
sum of individuals addressed by God, it is something existent beyond 
that, something essential and irreplaceable, and answerable to Him
as such. . .
Buber saw purpose in the human race as wqlj.^.s ip the 578
57Ibid., p. 127.
58 tiMartin Buber, "The Dialogue Between Heaven and Earth, "
At the Turning: Three Addresses on Judaism (New York: Farr. Straus
and Young, 1952), p. 196.
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individual. This was not a purpose arrived at by educated construction 
but a purpose discovered. Society cannot determine a purpose or goal 
and thereby set out on the proper path. "There is a purpose to 
creation: there is a purpose to the human race, one we have not made 
up ourselves, or agreed to among ourselves. . .  ̂ There is a strong
sense of awareness in the thought of Buber that the individual cannot 
completely fulfill his goal apart from society. "Throw yourself into 
the surging waves, reach for and grasp hands, lift, help, lead, 
authenticate spirit and alliance" Buber wrote, and "make the crowd 
no longer a crowd.
To become man, man must be man in relation to society. One
of the basic evils in society is that man comes under the domination of
the multitude. That society is degenerate that permits the individual
to come into servitude to the many, no matter how or under what name
fi 1that servitude is conceived.
The Need for Social Reconstruction
Man often seeks the security of the crowd, thinking that this is 
the path of confirmation. The collective recognizes him as a member 
of a given society and gives him a place recognition. This way is as *6
^M artin  Buber, Israel and the World: Essays in a Time of 
Crisis (New York: Schockon Books, 1948), p. 186.
6 0 Martin Buber, Pointing the Way: Collected Essays, trans. 
Maurice S. Friedman (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 111.
61Ib id ., p. 57.
- 5 9 -
false as that of self-confirmation.
This is not to say that socialism must, of necessity, be a 
failure: it is to say, that by and large, it has failed. It has blundered 
into a blind alley from which it can emerge only through genuine
OO
renewal of the spirit of community. Man must be willing to inves­
tigate the possibility of a Utopia, to help unfold the possibilities latent 
in mankind's communal life.
We cannot and do not want to go back to primitive agrarian 
communism or to the corporate state of the Middle Ages. We 
must. . . out of the recalcitrant materials of our own day in 
history, fashion a true community.
There is in Utopian Socialism, an organically constructive and 
purposive element which has as its aim the "restructuring of society" 
beginning here and now. 62 34*6 Ruber had serious doubts whether the old 
"community-forms" could ever be capable of necessary renewal; he 
warned that any new forms must of necessity be marked by a "com­
bination of freedom and order" if they are to become true communi- 
ties. He saw that when a culture was no longer experiencing a 
continually renewed relational process "it freezes into the It-world"
62Ibid. , p. 225.
63Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 6 .
64Ibid. , p. 8 .
6 Ibid. , p. 16.
66Ibid., p. 16.
^ I b i d . ,  p. 37.
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and from that time on becomes oppressive to the individual, and moves
C O
steadily toward its own doom.
Separation of Social Units as Evil
Buber endorsed a community built upon relationship but drew a 
contrast with this and the "amassing of human units" which have no 
relation to one another. He sees this evil of separation of social units 
as growing out of the basic problem of man's own failure to enter into
CQ
relationship with his fellow man. In fact, the ultimate renewal of 
society, if it should indeed occur, will have its beginning in the r e ­
newal of the relation of man with his fellow man and, ultimately, 
making a response to his You. ^
It is this isolation of man which prevents the renewal of society 
Man severs the I from the I-Thou relation and moves away from the 
realm of the spirit. Communication between man and man is broken;
man finds himself "wallowing in the Capital letter" to his own shame
71and to the shame of the world spirit.
Because man learns to walk as a severed I, he falls prey to 
the oppressions of society at every turn. Social leaders see individual 
members as consumers for produce, digits for service that are to be *69701
99Buber, I and Thou, p. 103.




calculated and used according to their assigned duties or estimated 
7 9va lu e.
Evil of Institutionalization
Institutionalization of society is a symptom of its illness. Men 
form institutions to prove they are not, in fact, a mass of severed I's. 
What they form becomes the severed It of institution rather than a real 
community of relation. ^
An institution may have its beginning in true community but, 
all too soon, the shell is hardened. Man is then identified as belong­
ing. He is identified and controlled by the severed institution. What 
the institution says he is, he accepts, and society endorses. This 
imprisonment into institutions is a gross evil and a deterent to the 
building of true community. The institution takes the controls and 
acts in the most despotic manner. But, man thinks he is in control. 
This deception is evil. 7^
Institutionalization of religion is seen by Buber as a barrier
to true relation with the eternal Thou.
Centralization and codification undertaken in the interest of 
religion, are a danger to the core of religion, unless there 72*45
72Ib id ., p. 96.
7 '3Ibid., p. 93.
74Ibid. , p. 109.
75 Ibid., p. 97.
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is the strongest life of faith, embodied in the whole existence 
of the community, and not relaxing in its renewing activity. 76
Ruber saw Hasidism as "the one great attempt in the history of
the Dispora to make a reality of the original choice and to found a true
i  n
and just, community. ‘ Although he was influenced by the Iiassidic 
Movement he acknowledged that it, too, had failed. Among the reasons 
for this failure was that "it did not aim for the independence, for the
n g
self-determination of the people. "
Society is also i l l  because it constantly endeavors to transfer 
the commands and prohibitions it considers important from the sphere 
of religion to morals. It seeks support for these items through public 
opinion and general consent; such things can be, to some degree, 
controlled and manipulated. These moral standards become laws and 
are thus translated into the language of It. What once began as a 
relation to the eternal Thou now becomes institutionalized and tends 
to prevent a return to the original relation. The eternal You, 
which cannot in truth ever become an It, is nevertheless transferred 
"ever again from You to an It.
7 6Martin Buber, The Prophetic Faith (New York- Harper 
Row Publishers, 1949), p. 170.
7 7Buber, Israel and the World, p. 159.
78Ibid., p. 159.
79Ibid. , pp. 86-7.
O o
Buber, I and Thou, pp. 160-1.
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Amalgamation of Social Units as Evil
Buber saw the tendency of the small communes to merge into
a higher social order as a social evil.
In the monstrous confusion of modern life. . . the individual 
clings desperately to the collectivity. The little society in 
which he was imbedded cannot help him; only the great 
collectivities, so he thinks can do that, and he is all too 
willing to let himself be deprived of personal responsibility: 
he only wants to obey. And the most valuable of all goods-- 
the life between man and man--gets lost in the process. 8^
At this point the personal human being ceases to be a living
member of a society and becomes a cog in the collective machine.
The autonomous relationships no longer have meaning; "personal
relationships wither, and the very spirit of man hires itself out as a
functionary. This, he thought, was demonstrated by the Russian
style of village society. "Only by means of a general revolt can the
isolation of the Russian Village Community be broken. " 83 "What I
complain of in Lenin, " he wrote, "is rather his failure to understand
that a fundamental centralism is incompatible" with the power and
freedom of the people. 8^
Central Authority as Evil
The central question, as Buber saw it, was: who should be
8 ^Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 132. 
82Ibid. , p. 132.
83Ibid., p. 93.
84Ib id., p. 110.
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the owner of the social means of production? Is the essential author­
ity to be the state? This, Huber thought to be contrary to the nature 
of a true community. He prefered the state to "discharge the functions
of adjustment and administration only. " This would reduce its power
85to its proper function, which, as he saw it, was to maintain unity.
The state must be prevented from becoming an evil, devouring thing if 
a society is to be established with the necessary elements of true 
community.
Nature of True Community
Capitalist society is no less deficient in structure than the 
Russian-style collective. The evidence of genuine community, and 
therefore of genuine humanity, is lacking. "And that is not some 
fortuitous and avoidable deviation, but is given with the system and 
is an inescapable consequence of it. D
Buber did not see economics as the primary element in a 
society. He applauded Hess for his support of a socialism "based 
not only on economic and technical state of development alone but also 
on that of the spirit.
85Ibid. . p. 145.
O g
°°Beek and Wei land, Martin Buber- Personalist and Prophet,
p. 100 .
8 7Martin Buber, Israel and Palestine: The History of an Idea, 
trans. Stanley Godman (London: East and West Library, 1952), p. 112.
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True socialism "can never be anything absolute. " It is
designed to be freedom itself and is to be
the continual becoming of human community in mankind, 
adapted and proportioned to whatever can be willed and done 
in the conditions given. The rigidity of Russian Communism 
threatens all such realization and is a negation of real 
freedom. * 8^
True nationalism should not be antagonistic to the community
o q
ideal. It becomes evil only if it makes the nation as end in itself.
The spirit of nationalism can be consistent with true community but 
nationalism "turned false" eats at the marrow of society. Any 
group which isolates itself ceases to be fruitful and becomes socially 
evil.
Like nationalism, producer and consumer cooperatives fail in 
the attempt to become true community because they eventually isolate 
themselves and make themselves their own end.
The true society must be built up of little societies based on 
the principal of communal life with association extending not only to 
individuals within the community but to the association of communities. 
Buber envisioned "a network of settlements, territorially based and 
federatively constructed" which would be without dogmatic rigidity 
and which would allow the "most diverse social forms to exist side by
88Ibid., p. 56.
8^Buber, Israel and the World, p. 221.
90Ibid. , p. 219.
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side" and which would always have as its aim the new "organic whole. "
It is necessary that the mutual relationship of all these little 
societies be determined "to the greatest possible extent ' by what 
Buber refers to as the "social principle, " that is, the principle of 
"inner cohesion, collaboration and mutual stimulation. " "
Buber saw the structurally rich society as one built up of local 
communes, "each one in vital association with the other. " Such a 
society cannot be composed of separate but of "associative units.
In the writings of both Marx and Lenin there is the socialist 
idea of a common society composed of little societies bound inwardly 
by common life and work. However, in the thinking of neither man is 
found the necessary reference for action. In both philosophies the 
decentralist element of re-structure is displaced by the centralist 
element of revolutionary politics.
The type of community that Buber has in mind is actively 
engaged in common and active management. The more a group 
allows itself to be represented in the management of its common 
affairs the less there exists the communal life and the more





impoverished it becomes as a community.
True community should always satisfy a concrete situation 
rather than an abstraction. If it is translated into a principle the 
shell begins to form and the structure becomes hardened. When this 
process has been finalized the possibility of community is lost; a true 
community must remain flexible, always the "moments answer to the 
moments question.
Community begins when its members recognize and act upon
an acceptance of a common center. It need not be "founded" in the
traditional sense of the term. Wherever history brings a group of
people together there is the possibility of genuine community, but
there is no guarantee that it will exist. When the members have a
common relation to the centre, as well as a common relation to each
q 7
other, true community exists.
This is not to suggest that community is a gathering of like- 
mindedness; it is quite the opposite. It is, in fact, the "overcoming 
of otherness" in a living unity which is its essence. In an ideal 
society each man would compensate by his knowledge for any lack of 
knowledge or understanding in his fellowman. In this way, men by
95Ibid., p. 133.
96Ibid., p. 134.
97Ibid. , p. 135.
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common thinking and knowing would constantly increase knowledge 
and understanding.
A real community need not consist of people who are perpet­
ually together; but it must consist of people who, precisely 
because they are comrades, have mutual access to one 
another and are ready for one another. A real community is 
one which in every point of its being possesses potentially at 
least, the whole character of community.
This whole character of community in Buber's thought does
not refer to an "aggregate of essentially unrelated individuals" for
such a group could be held together only by a coercive political
structure. It must be built of little societies
on the basis of communal life and of the association of these 
societies; and the mutual relations of the societies and their 
association must be determined to the greatest possible extent 
by the social principle--the principle of inner cohesion, co l­
laboration and mutual stimulation. I®*
"The Melekh YHVH, " Buber says "does not want to rule a crowd but
a community. Society by its very nature is not composed of
disparate individuals but rather is composed of "associative units and
the association between them,
Real community does not exist because of the feelings that
individuals have for each other although that, too, is a necessary
qq
Buber, Good and Evil, p. 10.
^^Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 145.
1 0 1T, . , QnIbid. , p. 80.
^ 2Buber, Prophetic Faith, p. 55.
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Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 14.
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ingredient. Community rests on two counts: all members of that 
society must "stand in a living, reciprocal relationship to a single 
living center, and they have to stand in a living, reciprocal relation­
ship to one another.
Buber believed that Society is structurally rich only to the 
extent that it is built up of genuine societies. For this reason he sees 
capitalism as "inherently poor in structure and growing visibly poorer 
every day. " For the same reason state socialism contributes 
little or nothing to the restructuring which Buber believes to be 
needed, "if something is to happen, then it must be achieved in small 
communities of people who are really and truly living together in 
association, Such a living together of men can.only thrive where
people have the real things in common, where they can 'experience, 
discuss and administer them together.
To understand the nature of man is to understand the use of 
power in community. Buber does not see power in society as an 
intrinsic evil. It is, he says, a "precondition for the actions of man. 
In an ideal society a "will to power" will be less concerned with being *1
1 04 Buber, I and Thou, p. 94.
1 06Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 13.
106°Beek and Weiland, Martin Buber: Personalist and Prophet,
p. 103.
1 07Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 15.
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"more powerful than" and more concerned with power for positive 
action. "Not power but power hysteria is evil. Power is neces­
sary to community life. "But we know that we have also to approach 
another power for information namely, community. When this
power is not invoked our knowledge remains fragmentary and inade­
quate. HO What is at work here is the longing for that rightness which 
in religious or philosophical vision is experienced as revelation or 
idea, and which of its very nature cannot be realized in the individual, 
but only in human community, m
Does a pattern for true community exist? Buber says "yes.
The Jewish Village Communes in Palestine owes its existence not to
119a doctrine but to a situation. Here is community arising out of the
need, stress, and the demand of the situation.
As I see history and the present there is only one all-out 
effort to create a full co-operative which justifies our 
speaking of success in the socialistic sense, and that is the 
Jewish Village Commune in its various forms, as found in 
Palestine. 1  ̂
Why are communes of Palestine different from those of Russia'?
*^Buber, Israel and the World, p. 216.
1 09 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 156.
^^Ib id ., p. 156.
Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 7.
1 12tu . , 1/1QIb id ., p. 142.




Russia, Buber says, has not undergone an essential inner change 
The sickness of the age is that the It world has become a gigantic 
swamp because it is no longer "fertilized by the living currents of the 
You-world. "115 in Palestine the concrete conditions were present and 
true community existed. There was found this "League of Leagues 
which makes a society a community indeed.
This condition, according to Buber, did not exist in Russia.
"We must designate one of the two poles of socialism between which 
our choice lies, by the formidable name of 'Moscow'. The other I 
would make bold to call 'Jerusalem'.
Although the expectation of Buber was that Jerusalem would be 
the center for the renewal of society, he was aware that "Nations can 
be led to peace only by a people which has made peace a reality 
within itself.
Summary
Evil in the community results from man's lack of communica­
tion. This isolation is evident in man's relation to man and in the 1
114Ibid., p. 149.
1 ^Buber, I and Thou, p. 102.
1 1 R
Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 148.
1 17Ibid., p. 149.
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separation of social units. Attempts to amalgamate social units by 
central authority fails because true community is possible only where 
individuals relate one to another and to a living center. Social evil is
remedied by the development of true community.
CHAPTER IV
THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY 
OF MARTIN BUBER
Nature of Education
Buber desired to teach not a view but the way. * He realized 
that the trend of replacing direct experiences with indirect experience 
was evil because it dealt with the acquisition of information rather 
than with human becoming. " Ideal education leads man to a lived 
connection with his world, and enables him to ascend to faithfulness, 
standing the test, authenticating, responsibility, decision and
Q
realization.
Buber rejected teaching which consisted only as a collection of 
knowable material. "Either the teachings live in the life of a 
responsible human being, or they are not alive at all. It is never 
enough for man to merely be cognizant of certain facts. Rather he 1*4
1 Buber, I and Thou, p. 139.
^Ibid., p. 89.
^Buber, Pointing the Way, p. 108.
4
Buber, Israel and the World, p. 140.
-73-
-74-
must be "seized by the teachings" in such a way that "his elemental
,,5
totality must submit to the spirit as clay to the potter.
Such a commitment to teaching leads away from the performing 
of "prescribed rites" toward the power to make the original choice. 
Thus one may choose out of will to act responsibly, and to "despise 
the inflexible self-assurance" of this age to the place where one may 
hear the message for his hour.
True education is not a teaching of what is nor of what ought to 
be; it is a teaching of "how to live in the spirit, in the countenance of 
the You. " At this point, the word becomes life; this life is teaching 
and "stands ready to become a You for them at any time, opening up 
the You world.
Education is not the means toward a goal; it is the choosing of 
a path the nature of which terminates in the desired goal. "He who 
takes a road that in its nature does not already represent the nature of 
the goal will miss the goal. " In true education, the goal will resemble
O
the road by which one reaches it.
Methodology in Education
To educate, in the thought of Buber, was to guide toward
"*Ibid., p. 89.
6Ibid. , pp. 162-3.
7
Buber, I and Thou, p. 92.
g
JBuber, Pointing the Way, p. 105.
-75-
reality and realization. "That man alone is qualified to teach who 
knows how to distinguish between appearance and reality. " ‘1 It is not 
enough to proceed toward something, "one must also proceed from 
something. One must have a point of beginning; an orientation 
from a beginning is as necessary as orientation toward a goal.
Man does not desire to recognize either an origin or a goal 
because he no longer wants to recognize the midpoint. ■ *1 If man 
should acknowledge a midpoint, he would be forced to accept the 
responsibility for the lived moment, filled with possibility and with 
decision. He is content to allow history to ripple toward him 'from 
some prehistorical cosmic age. " Man does not want to acknowledge 
responsibility, and therefore dismisses both origin and goal as 
unknowables. To be responsible means to use "the capacity of that 
day to the full;" if he has accomplished this "he has done enough. 1,1" 
There can be no origin or goal without responsibility and "there is no 
responsibility unless there is One to whom one is responsible.
This is not to suggest that scientific knowledge and aesthetic 
understanding is not desirable or even necessary. Buber suggests, 910*2
9Ibid., p. 105.
10Ibid. , p. 99.
Buber, Israel and the World, p. 95.
12 Ibid., p. 32.
 ̂^Ibid. , p. 19.
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however, that having done its work faithfully such understanding should 
"immerse itself and disappear in that truth of the relation which sur­
passes understanding and embraces what is understandable. "14 *718
Teaching must be closely allied with doing; doing apart from 
the teachings is no education. The knowledge of the perfected man 
is "not in his thinking but in his action. " Education is primarily the 
development of the second element of the twofold principle of human 
life: the first Buber calls "the primal setting at a distance" and the 
second the "entering into relation. 1,1 ̂  Life is a living relationship; 
such relationship is possible only after there has been a setting at a 
distance, so that independent opposites exist. The animal world 
(Umwelt) knows no such setting-over-against. It is only in man that 
this separation from one's environment is recognized; only in the 
Umwelt of man is that relation possible. Only in man is being (Sein) 
detached, and recognized for itself. "Only when a structure of being 
is independently over against a living being (Seinde), an independent 
opposite, does a world exist. i0
Only man gives distance to things so they may be studied in a
14Buber, I and Thou, p. 91.
1 5' Buber, Israel and the World, p, 95.
^Buber, Pointing the Way, p. 52.
l7Buber, "Distance and Relation, " The Knowledge of Man, p. 60.
18Ibid., pp. 60-1.
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separate manner, and exist for a separate function. A monkey may
use a branch or a stick and cast it aside; man only has the ability to
set such a weapon aside to be used again and again for a specified 
1 dpurpose. °
This primal step of setting apart is only the first step in the 
education of man. To possess or use such tools must give way to the 
matter of man's relation to them. "Man sets things which he uses at 
a distance, he gives them into an independence in which function gains 
duration, he reduces and empowers them to be the bearers of the 
function. Man's relationship with the things he uses in the It 
world is on a different plane than his personal relationships with 
creatures of like nature in the You world. Once the identification of 
an It has been made in such a way that it no longer denotes a relation 
between a human I and a tree You but the perception of the tree object 
by the human consciousness, it has erected the crucial barrier be­
tween subject and object; the basic word I-It, the word of separation,
21has been spoken.
The relationship which produces the truly human is a gradual 
awareness which reveals its development through the "reciprocal 19
19Ibid., p. 65.
2 DIbid., p. 66 .
2 1 Buber, I and Thou, pp. 74-5.
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forces of confrontation. "22 The world is built, not by a child's being
aware of an object and then entering into relation with it; rather, the
longing for relation is primary. The relation with the innate You is
2 8primary and is realized in the You of encounter.
Man "becomes an I through a You. When this basic con­
sciousness of personal existence finally bursts forth from its inter­
woven consciousness with a You, man stands ready for the world of 
experience and the world of relationship. In the world of experience 
man says I-It and assumes a position of oppositeness but does not 
confront things "in the current of reciprocity. " Only in the It world 
does man arrange and classify knowledge. "The You knows no system 
of coordinates.
The It-World is necessary if man is to live; whoever lives only 
in it is not truly human. The It can become a You by entering into the 
event of relation and "the individual You must become an It when the 
event of relation has run its course.
Education does not begin with the possession of a knowledge of 
things, but rather with a relationship "which surpasses understanding
22 Ibid., p. 72.
23t, . , Ibid. , p. 78.
24t, . , Ibid. , p. 80.




and embraces what is understandable.
Knowledge: as he beholds what confronts him. its being is 
disclosed to the knower. What he beheld as present he will 
have to comprehend as an object, compare with objects, 
assign a place in an order of objects, and describe and 
analyze objectively; only as an It can it be absorbed into the 
store of knowledge. But in the act of beholding it was no 
thing among things, no event among events; it was present 
exclusively. ^
When knowledge becomes objective it is "locked into the It- 
form of conceptual knowledge. Whoever unlocks it and beholds it 
again as present, fulfills the meaning of that act of knowledge as
nO Qsomething that is actual and active between man.
Purpose of Education
Education must assist in breaking the imprisonment of "the 
person in history, and his speech in a library. " It is not enough to be 
well-informed. True education teaches "not what is and not what 
ought to be, but how one lives in the spirit, in the countenance of the 
You. "30 True human life is created only when the central You is 
received in the present. 31
Man needs to be taught the truth of relation because the
27Ibid., p. 90.





It-World tends to grow over him "like weeds" so that his I loses its 
actuality.
The capricious man does not believe and encounter. He does 
not know association; he only knows the feverish world out 
there and his feverish desire to use it. . .In truth he has no 
destiny but is merely determined by things and drives, feels 
autocratic, and is capricious. He has no great will and tries 
to pass off caprice in its place. ,3̂
Man must learn to give up capriciousness and move toward
belief in the actual; he must be taught to accept "the real association
of the real duality, I and You. " He needs to learn that destiny needs
him, that it "does not lead him" but it waits for him.
But the free man does not have an end here and then fetch 
the means from there; he has only one thing; always only his 
resolve to proceed toward his destiny. . .he would sooner 
believe that he was not really alive then he Would believe that 
the resolve of the great will was insufficient and required the 
support of means. He believes; he encounters. * 33 345
Man becomes what he potentially may become through relation, 
through the touching of the You. "Whoever stands in relation, partic­
ipates in an actuality; that is, in a being that is neither merely a part 
of him nor merely outside him. " 36 If there is no participation, then 
there is no actuality.
'^Ibid. , p. 96.
33Ibid., p. 109.
34Ibid. , p. 108.
35Ib id ., p. 1 1 0 .
36Ibid. , p. 113.
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There are two poles of humanity, not two kinds of human 
beings. No human is pure person; no one pure ego. The person be­
holds himself; the ego occupies himself with his My. The more dom­
inant the ego the more the human being falls prey to inactuality. The 
more person-oriented one becomes the more person he is. Between
Q 7
these two poles history takes place.
One purpose of education is to help the I relate to its world, so
that it may truly become. In the other, the evil course, the I turns
inside and seeks to develop its potential within itse lf--
which is to say that it unfolds where there is no room for it 
to unfold. Thus the confrontation within the self comes into 
being, and this cannot be relation, presence, the current of 
reciprocity, but only self-contradiction. 33
This self-contradiction tends to pull man apart rather than to
unite him. This dissection is the basic evil which prevents man from
becoming whole. It is the wholeness of the human being toward which
education should aim; "It is the whole being, closed in its wholeness,
,,39
at rest in its wholeness, that is active here. . . Every true 
relation depends on one having become whole.
The ultimate in this relationship is to discover him whom one 
cannot seek, "the mysterium tremendum, that appears and overwhelms.
37Ibid., pp., 114-5
38., .. Ibid., p. 119.
39tk-sIbid. , p. 125.
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t
This discovery is not made by teaching in a prescription manner; that 
is, one cannot say thus and so is the way. Rather, one discovers the 
way as he learns to enter into "pure relationship. " He does not r e ­
nounce all other relationships in order to discover the eternal You. 
Instead, he brings with him all other relationships; here "unconditional 
exclusiveness and unconditional inclusiveness are one. "4<~) One finds
here the eternal center containing all pure relations; every genuine
41encounter is a way station which grants one a view of fulfillment. 
"Actually, the absolute relationship includes all relative relationships, 
and is, unlike them, no longer a part but the whole in which all of them
A 9
are consummated and become one. "
God embraces but is not the universe; just so, God embraces 
but is not myself. On account of this which cannot be spoken 
about, I can say in my language, as all can say in theirs: You. 
For the sake of this there are I and You, there is dialogue, 
there is language, and spirit whose primal deed language is, 
and there is, in eternity, the word.
Is the ultimate goal of man to become whole, and encounter 
God so he may then forever mit Gott befasse? Buber says "no.
Man would rather "henceforth attend to God" than he would to prove 
the meaning of such an encounter in action in the world. "All
40Ib id ., p. 122.
41 Ibid. , p. 128.
42Ibid., p. 129.
43
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revelation is a calling and a mission. But again and again man shuns 
actualization and bends back toward the revealer: he would rather 
attend to God than to the world.
Buber believed that "Education worthy of the name is essentially 
education of character. " The concern of the educator is always the 
"person as a whole, both in the actuality in which he lives before you 
now and in his possibilities, what he can become.
Role of the Teacher in Education
Buber warned against an over-estimation of what a teacher
could do to develop character. To give instruction in ethics may
result only in having "the worst habitual liar of the class produce a
brilliant essay on the destructive power of lying. Such instruction
is fatal because it seems to produce results which are not really there.
Nothing is transformed, only an excellent paper has been produced.
Only in his whole being, in all his sponteneity can the 
educator truly affect the whole being of his pupil. For edu­
cating characters you do not need a moral genius, but you do 
need a man who is wholly alive and^able to communicate him­
self directly to his fellow beings.
The educator is only one of many influences exerted upon the 
44Ibid., p. 164.
^^Buber, "The Education of Character, " Between Man and 
Man, p. 104.
46Ibid. , p. 105.
47Ibid. , p. 105.
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individual. Nature and society, language and custom, history and art, 
work and play, these and many other elements combine in formation 
of character. The educator must seek to interpenetrate all these 
multifarious influences. This he does by his "will to take part in the 
stamping of character" and the realization that he represents a certain 
selection of what should be. ^8
Generally it is not the business of the educator to "te ll" what 
is right or wrong. Yet, when approached with a problem of ethics, 
he must lead beyond the alternatives of the question by showing a 
third possibility which he believes to be a right one. A concrete 
question deserves a concrete answer to a concrete situation. This, 
Buber emphasizes, "can only happen in an atmosphere of confidence.
The teacher must not expect complete agreement on the part of 
the student. Conflicts serve to educate if they take place in a healthy 
atmosphere. A conflict with a pupil is a supreme test for the edu­
cator. "He must not blunt the piercing impact of his knowledge, but 
he must at the same time have in readiness the healing ointment for 
the heart pierced by it.
This is where the educator can begin and should begin. He
can help the feeling that something is lacking to grow into
48Ibid. , p. 106.
4Q Ibid., p. 107.
50Ibid. , p. 107.
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the clarity of consciousness and into the force of desire.
He can awaken in young people the courage to shoulder life 
again. He can bring before his pupils the image of a great 
character who denies no answer to life and the world, but 
accepts responsibility for everything essential that he 
meets. . .Genuine education of character is genuine edu-G 1
cation for community.
Role of the Pupil in Education
Dewey held that all social institutions revealed their value
only as they set free and developed the capacities of human individ- 
52uals. Buber believed that individuals, not institutions, could 
perform this function. He thought the matter of developing human 
capacity did not deal with what is already existing in the individual. 
Rather, the potential lay in the fact that the child can have a share in 
his own becoming. What arises is not what was already there; in 
education something arises which was not there before. The desire to 
participate in its own becoming and to help in the creation of its own 
end, Buber contributes to an autonomous instinct, the "instinct of
• • • | j ̂  Qorigination.
This instinct is not one to "grab" or to "get. " It is rather to 
create and give. It is directed toward "doing" rather than having. 
There are two indispensable activities involved in true human life to
5 1 Ibid., p. 116.
52 ^
1 John Dewey, "Moral Reconstruction, " Reconstruction in 
Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), p. 186.
53Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 86.
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which this instinct, if left to itself, does not lead. The first is the 
sharing in an undertaking and the second is the entering into
,. S4mutuality.
The development of this originator instinct is of concern to the 
educator.
The finest demonstration I know, that I have just got to know, 
is this Children's Choir led by the marvellous Bakule of 
Prague. . .How under his leadership crippled creatures, 
seemingly condemned to life-long idleness, have been released 
to a life of freely moving person, rejoicing in their achieve­
ment, formable and forming, who know how to shape sights and 
sounds in multiform patterns and also how to sing out of their 
risen souls wildly and gloriously; more, how a community of 
achievement. . .has been welded together out of dull immured 
solitary creatures- all this seems to prove irrefutably not 
merely what fruitfulness but also what power, streaming 
through the whole constitution of man, the life of origination 
has. ^
An education based only upon the training of the instinct of 
origination would prepare a new form of human solitariness. What 
teaches one to say Thou is "not the originative instinct but the instinct 
for communion. " This instinct is the "longing for the world to become 
present to us as a person. Only if someone grasps the hand as a 





56Ibid. , p. 88.
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Summary
To educate is to guide toward reality. This is done by commu­
nication and confrontation, rather than the amassing of technical data. 
Education begins with the individual and seeks to make him aware that 
there are other individuals, who are also subjects, living in his world.
Through communication and confrontation with others who are 
a part of his world and yet have a world of their own. he develops both 
a Self-consciousness and a We-consciousness. It is through commu­
nication with others in the area of the "between" that man becomes 
human and learns how to participate in humanity and in community. 
Man's failure to communicate is the basic evil in both the individual 
and the community.
Education must be concerned with the person as a whole. Only 
then can the pupil be caused to face the reality of the present moment 
as well as the potential of the lived life. The educated man is the man 
who has learned what it means to be human; he is capable of partaking 
in humanity and participating in community.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The problem of evil in the individual and the problem of evil 
in community is in reality a single problem: Man fails to reach out to 
his fellow man in communion and mutual understanding. He bends his 
spirit back into himself where it has no room to grow.
The spirit of man develops into a truly human spirit in what 
Buber calls the "realm of the between. " In this realm, spirit meets 
spirit and both are "fertilized" by the association; both grow and 
develop into the potential of its own peculiar createdness.
The failure to move outside one's self is evil because it 
prevents the development of the individual into a person. Such 
development comes by the way of communion.
The communion between persons is not for an intellectually 
elite alone. This communion takes place at the level of ones exist­
ence; man may begin where he is. Man may enter into dialogue with 
his fellowman, but he is not forced to do so. The individual stands 
each moment "before concrete reality which wishes to reach out to
-88-
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him and receive an answer from him. Man decides whether he will 
reach out or whether he remains imprisoned within his shell. The 
moment of "breakthrough" is reached when man decides to respond.
The lack of response of a man to "concrete reality" prevents 
the development of true community; it, too, is dependent upon man's 
willingness to reach into the realm of the "between" and enter into 
association with his fellowman.
The basic solution to the problem of evil is a single solution: 
The unification of man. Only a man who has become whole can will to 
break out of his shell of self and reach out to the world of the between.
To become whole, in the terminology of Buber, is to 'unite 
the two urges. " The evil urge, which is passion is united with the 
good urge, which is direction. Man then becomes capable of deliber­
ate choice.
The uniting of the two urges to become whole is a prerequisite 
for the establishment of community. Only as persons become able to 
enter into communion can community be established. The purpose of 
the unification of the individual is the unification of the world.
Man must live with things. To deny their existence is 
unrealistic; it is when man lives only in a world of things that he 
crowds out the reality which confronts him. To place confidence in 
the It-world for security and self-fulfillment is to miss reality; it is
^Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 39.
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to choose the impossible in the place of the actual. The more man 
relies on the It-world for the enrichment of life, the more damage is 
done to the world of relation.
The sickness of our age is unlike that of any other and yet
belongs with the sickness of all. The history of culture is not
a stadium of eons in which one runner after another must covero
the same circle of death, cheerfully and unconsciously.
There is a solution to the sickness of this age; it is a remedy
O
Buber calls Umkehr. In the act of returning Buber sees the redemp­
tion of society and the individual.
By returning Buber does not suggest the going back to the place 
where one once was; it is rather a break-through from the world of 
things to the world of relation.
It is a descent through the spirals of the spiritual underworld 
but could also be called an ascent to the innermost, subtlest, 
most intricate turn that knows no Beyond and even less any 
Backward but only the unheard of return--the breakthrough.
This turning is the crucial act in education. Can one indeed
teach how to turn? Buber says "yes, " and this teaching must begin
with the awareness that man is capable of turning: That is, man must
be taught the true meaning of freedom. "Even as freedom and fate
belong together, caprice belongs with doom. But freedom and fate
^Buber, I and Thou, p. 104.
^Walter Kaufman, "Prologue, " I and Thou, p. 35.
^Buber, I and Thou, pp. 104-5.
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are promised to each other and embrace each other to constitute
• f f Rmeaning;. . . .
Until one learns that he can turn he is not free. The bondage 
of caprice is sometimes in the sick world thought of as freedom. The 
capricious man does not believe and encounter. "He does not know 
association; he only knows the feverish world out there and his 
feverish desire to use it. " To gain freedom. Ruber says, from the 
belief in unfreedom "is to gain freedom. "D
Man must learn more than that he is free to turn from the It- 
world to the world of relation. Man must become conscious of him­
self as participating in being- That is, as he becomes conscious of 
"being-with" he becomes conscious of being.
It is only as man acknowledges his being and recognizes his 
freedom that he is able to choose. It is this making the choice which 
is all-important to Buber's educational philosophy, for man can only 
truly choose with his total being. The power of decision presupposes 
unification of the total person. It is only when the being becomes 
whole that one goes forth deliberately in search of those extended
. n
lines of relation which make possible true being and true community. 
"Extended, the lines of relationships intersect the eternal You. Every 5*7
5Ibid., p. 108.




single You is a glimpse of that. Through every single You the basic
1 tftword addresses the eternal You.
How does man move to this realm of relationship from a 
world of It-dominance ? By deciding. If one has become whole he may 
choose the path. If in deciding he recognizes that it is not with his 
whole being, he nevertheless becomes aware of direction, the freedom 
to choose, and potentiality. 8 *
At this point man is ready to assume his responsibility in the 
community. He may have performed certain functions before but only 
as he freely chooses does he answer with responsibility the call to 
true community relation.
A community is not simply a group of people. Such amassing 
in political entities only compound problems unless the spirit which 
forms community is present. This spirit is active when each member 
of that society has a common relation to each other and all have a 
common relation to a living center. Until man learns to relate, true 
community is impossible.
Buber rejected capitalism as a means toward the establish­
ment of community. Although it was capitalism which gave birth to 
socialism, 10 he saw it as "inherently poor in structure and growing
8Ibid. , p. 123.
^Buber, Good and Evil, p. 35.
10Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 13.
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visibly poorer every day.
He rejected the idea of primitive agrarian communism, saying 
"we cannot and do not want to go hack.
Huber agreed with Proudhoun that centralization of government 
offered advantages but was too costly. In such a society the individual 
no longer belongs to himself; he "cannot feel his worth, his life, and no 
account is taken of him at all.
The experiments in co-operatives were condemned "by the 
nature of things to isolation. The "zig-zag line" served as a "tragic 
misdevelopment of the Socialist Movement. " What it had made propa- 
ganda--the evolution of new social form --"was neither the real object
, ,1 C
of its thought nor the real goal of its action.
Buber saw the rebirth of the commune as the answer to the
development of true community.
A rebirth--not a bringing back. It cannot in fact be brought 
back. . .Yet whether a rebirth of the commune will ensue 
from the 'water and spirit' of the social transformation that 
is imminent--on this, it seems to me, hangs the whole fate of 
the human race. °
* "4bid. , p. 13.
12Ibid., p. 15.
13Ibid. , p. 33.
14Ibid., p. 79.
15Ibid. , p. 98.
1 6-pi . .Ib id ., p. 136
There was in the mind of Buber "an experiment that did not 
fail. " He saw the .Jewish Village Commune of Palestine, in its 
various forms, an "all-out effort to create a full co-operative which
1 n
justifies our speaking of success in the socialistic sense. Here the
"ideal motive remained loose and pliable in almost every respect.
More important, however, is that, behind the historical 
situation of a people visited by a great external crisis and 
responding to it with a great inner change. . . The Pioneer 
Spirit ( "Chalvzivth") is, in every part of it, related to the 
growth of a new and transformed national community; the 
moment it grew self-sufficient it would have lost its soul. *9
Buber saw this bold Jewish undertaking as a "signal non­
failure. " He did not attempt to call it a success. "To become that, 
much has still to be done.
Where does one begin? Buber would say 'Begin where you 
are. " When does one begin? His answer would be "now. " How does 
one begin? "By beginning, " Buber would answer, "there is no estab­
lished formula. "
CONCLUSIONS
1. Buber's educational philosophy emphasize the necessity for 
the individual to accept responsibility for his lived life. One can do *18920
* ̂ Ibid. , p. 141.
18Ibid., p. 142.
19Ibid., p. 143.
20Ibid. , p. 148.
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this by willing direction, by choosing. Such choice can be made only 
by an individual who has become whole. This becoming whole is 
realized by acting upon the knowledge that evil is something to be 
transformed rather than something to be overcome. This concept is 
the core of his philosophy of evil and one of the presuppositions upon 
which his educational philosophy is constructed.
2. The educational philosophy of Martin Buber is a viable 
philosophy of education and should be brought to the attention of edu­
cators and prospective educators by the most effective means possible.
3. Buber's concept of education of the individual suggests that 
education should be goal-oriented. One must intend to teach how to 
become whole, how to be human. Capricious learning is not capable 
of producing the end product of true humanity. One must intend to 
teach how to become whole if it is expected that others will learn.
4. Education must be willed by the individual. Education 
worthy of the name must be a conscious selection of his effective 
environment by the person being educated.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. The philosophy of Buber concerning community should be 
further investigated as it relates to his prime example, i. e. the 
communes of Palestine. This study should investigate whether these 
communes have further developed his concept of community and 
investigate the causative factors related to any change which may
-96-
have taken place.
2. Buber saw knowledge as capable of being stored in the 
human consciousness only as an It. Each Thou-relation must be 
transformed to an It-experience before it can be brought into the 
store of knowledge. Further study is recommended to determine 
whether knowledge, in Buber's thought, is transferred in the I-Thou 
relation and if  so, in what state or condition this knowledge presents 
itself prior to transformation and codification.
3. During the course of this study the author became aware of 
a strong relation between the teaching of Hasidism and the basic con­
cepts of Buber concerning evil. A thorough study of this movement 
and its influence upon the presuppositions of Buber would further 
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